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Abstract
IT, Multimedia and Telecommunications Department
Doctoral Programme on Network and Information Technologies
Integrating secure mobile P2P systems and Wireless Sensor Networks
by Marc Domingo Prieto
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have become very important in the current net-
worked society, since they can acquire and send useful and valuable information at
low installation and maintenance costs when compared with their wired counterparts.
WSNs enable the digitalization of new physical things, which have not been tracked
until now. The benefits of WSNs are not only economical but also functional, as they
allow easy and fast deployment as well as node mobility and dynamic network topolo-
gies, which greatly impacts temporary installations. This technology additionally en-
ables the retrieval of a large amount of useful data coming from the environment.
WSNs have traditionally been related to industries such as military, oil and gas; how-
ever, as their popularity has increased, they have become ubiquitous in many other
fields and are already part of our daily lives. For example, in modern cities the concept
of smart city is being realized through the deployment of sensors throughout the ur-
ban environment in order to monitor noise, the atmospheric pollution, garbage levels,
parking occupancy, traffic flows and structural health.
WSN technology is still in its initial stages, with many challenges that need to be over-
come on various levels. On the one hand, sensors have limited resources for collecting
and sending data. On the other hand, the cloud platform must be able to process, store
and spread a lot of information to many consumers in a secure fashion. This thesis
focuses on the limitations existing at different levels. At a lower level, we concentrate
on energy consumption while, at a higher level, we focus on the dissemination and
security of information.
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WSN motes are usually battery-powered and expend their energy with periodic triggers
that perform a reading of one of their integrated sensors, with the information then
being processed and sent over the radio. Since batteries have limited power, the motes
have a limited lifetime. Additionally, the consumption of a mote is normally related
to external triggers that can be different between motes on the same WSN, thus the
lifetime of each mote ends up being different. Moreover, since motes are generally
installed in inaccessible places, there is a significant cost incurred for each intervention
to replace a mote or change its battery. Therefore, reducing the operation costs caused
by the limited and unpredictable lifetime of motes is one of the greatest challenges
to making this technology viable in new environments. In this thesis, we focus on
reducing the consumption of an individual mote and extending the consumption of
networks as a whole.
To reduce the consumption of an individual mote, we focus on the radio because it is
one of the main components responsible for expending energy. In general, energy is
consumed when sending application messages from sensor motes to the gateway, but
also when performing additional message exchanges required by the network protocol.
Many mechanisms exist, but few of them take into consideration the dynamic traffic
patterns that are typical of WSNs. Therefore, we have proposed a Scheduling Func-
tion (SF) to be applied over the 6top sub-layer. In order to reduce the consumption
in networks with dynamic traffic patterns, the proposal is based on the well-known
Proportional-Integral-Derivative (PID) controller.
The second proposal analyses how to more equally distribute the consumption of all
the motes in a network when the number of messages sent by each mote is different.
We do so by creating messages with variable packet size. In this way, the interventions
and therefore the maintenance costs of WSNs are reduced.
At a higher level, we take into account that a great amount of information must be
distributed and processed by constrained resources and that, even though such infor-
mation can be easily gathered locally, global access is often necessary. Therefore, we
consider it convenient to have some middleware that integrates access to and configu-
ration of sensor motes, making it easier to access from a desktop and mobile devices.
Peer-to-peer (P2P) networks are an efficient method for distributing information in a
self-organized manner. In terms of the connectivity of their devices, these networks
also provide incredible benefits such as scalability and reliability. For these reasons,
we consider that P2P systems are a perfect match in this scenario. In this thesis, we
have proposed jxSensor, which is an integration layer between WSNs and the well-
known JXTA P2P system. WSN sensor motes are treated as normal peers inside a
network, taking advantage of P2P capabilities. Additionally, this integration has been
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created while taking into account sensor mote limitations, thus ensuring that the sensor
mote constraints are not accentuated with this integration.
Finally, the employed security mechanisms cannot be neglected, because real data
coming from the environment is combined with P2P and thus new threads appear.
One example is that a real subject can be identified and tracked. For these reasons,
an anonymity layer was proposed in the P2P framework, and a light authentication
mechanism was added to its mobile version, thereby taking into account the system’s
limitations and minimizing the overhead produced. Authentication is one of the first
security requirements, and it ensures that no one injects false data from a WSN into
the P2P system.
To sum up, this thesis addresses different limitations found in WSNs in order to en-
able their deployment in new scenarios as well as to make it easier to disseminate the
gathered information.
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Introduction
This chapter presents the motivations for carrying out this thesis as well as its rele-
vance. In Section 1.1, the problem face by this thesis is contextualized and introduced.
Section 1.2 explains similar research found in the literature review of the two main
areas covering this thesis. The objectives of this thesis are presented in Section 1.3. In
Section 1.4 the research methodology used to conduct this thesis is shown. Finally, the
structure of the rest of the document is found in Section 1.5.
1.1 Statement of the problem
In the current networked society, Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have become
very important because they can acquire and send useful, valuable information at low
installation and maintenance costs, particulary when compared with their wired coun-
terparts. WSNs enable the digitalization of new physical things which have not been
tracked until now. The benefits of WSNs are not only economical but also functional,
as they allow easy and fast deployment as well as node mobility and dynamic network
topologies, which greatly impacts temporary installations. Additionally, this technol-
ogy enables the retrieval of a large amount of useful data coming from the environment.
WSNs have been traditionally related to industries such as military, oil and gas, but
their increasing popularity has led to them becoming ubiquitous in many other fields
and they are now already part of our daily lives [6].
For example, in modern cities the concept of smart city is being realized through the
deployment of sensors throughout the urban environment in order to monitor noise,
atmospheric pollution, garbage levels, parking occupancy, traffic flows and structural
health. WSNs are also coming into the homes and monitoring environmental condi-
tions such as temperature, humidity and light in order to improve comfort while min-
imizing power consumption. Additionally, WSNs are starting to become commonly
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used for keeping track of everyday machines such as cars in order to minimize main-
tenance and increase security by monitoring, for instance, tire pressure. Furthermore,
WSNs are used in health to monitor chronically ill patients or the elderly.
WSN technology is still in its initial stages, with many challenges that need to be over-
come on various levels. On the one hand, sensors have to collect and send data with its
limited resources. On the other hand, the cloud platform must be able to process, store
and spread a lot of information to many consumers in a secure fashion. This thesis
focuses on the limitations existing at different levels. At a lower level, we concentrate
on energy consumption while, at a higher level, we focus on the dissemination and
security of information.
Beginning at the low-level viewpoint, we take into account an individual WSN sensor,
whose main functions are:
• Sensing the environment
• Processing the captured data
• Sending some data to the gateway
WSNs motes are usually battery-powered and expend their energy with periodic trig-
gers that perform a reading of one of their integrated sensors, with the information then
being processed and sent over radio. Since batteries have limited power, the motes have
a limited lifetime. Additionally, the consumption of a mote is normally related to ex-
ternal triggers that can be different between motes on the same WSN, thus the lifetime
of each mote ends up being different. Moreover, since motes are generally installed in
inaccessible places, there is a significant cost incurred for each intervention to replace
a mote or change its battery. Therefore, reducing the operation costs caused by the
limited and unpredictable lifetime of motes is one of the greatest challenges to making
this technology viable in new environments. This challenge can be faced in different
ways:
• Reducing the consumption of an individual mote.
• Extending the lifetime of the network as a whole.
• Increasing battery capacity or harvesting energy from the environment.
In this thesis we are going to focus on the first two approaches: reducing the energy
consumption of an individual mote and extending the lifetime of the network as a
whole. The third approach is more of a physics problem related to the composition of
both the battery and the harvesting sensor; thus, it is beyond the scope of this work.
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In order to address the first approach toward reducing the consumption of an individual
mote, it is necessary to evaluate how each mote wastes power. As stated in [7], the main
sources of WSN battery drain are:
• Gathering data
• Processing data
• Sending data
There is a broad set of different types of sensors for sensing the environment, such as
inclinometers and magnetometers. Their energy consumption results from the physics
behind of the sensor. In the processing stage, complex calculations are performed in
the minimum amount of time and with the lowest power consumption. In the data-
transmitting stage, the main challenge lies in defining a protocol that keeps the mote
connected to the network so it can send and receive data while using the minimum
amount of energy. This is additionally complex since typical WSN applications re-
quire bursty traffic, meaning that the mote does not need to send messages during long
periods of time, but instead the network must have enough capacity to transmit a bunch
of messages when a trigger is pulled.
Sensor, processor and radio manufacturers are improving both performance and con-
sumption every year, but their efforts must also be accompanied by the development of
new protocols that take advantage of the new features and make WSNs viable in new
scenarios. Currently, one of the main components responsible for expending energy
is the radio. In general, energy is consumed when sending application messages from
sensor motes to the gateway, but also when performing additional message exchanges
required by the network protocol. In WSNs there are mainly two types of networks:
those that are long range and low bit rate, and those that are short range and high
bitrate.
On the one hand, the first type of network is called Low-Power Wide-Area Network
(LPWAN), and it uses direct communication between the mote and the gateway. The
most well known technologies of this type are LoRaWAN [8] and Sigfox [9]. These
types of networks have no coordination problem, since a mote needs to send a message
to only a single entity. The main issue is how to reduce the information sent, since
battery consumption per byte sent is very high.
On the other hand, the second type of network communication is known as multi-
hop, meaning that the packet sent by a mote can go through different motes until it
reaches the base station or gateway. In these networks, each mote has two functions:
send messages to neighbors, and receive messages from neighbors. For this reason
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these networks tend to be synchronized. A typical example of these networks is the
IEEE802.15.4e [10]. In this kind of network, messages are sent frequently between
motes to maintain synchronization, so the main issue is not to reduce the amount of
data sent, but to reduce the signaling information exchanged between motes in order
to keep them synchronized and adapt the communication channels to the transmission
necessities, thus minimizing its consumption. This last part has been gaining the at-
tention of many researchers, since new protocols are appearing every day and opening
new research areas with a lot of potentially new improvements.
In the second approach to extending the lifetime of the network as a whole in order
to reduce the number of interventions, one idea is balancing the consumption between
all motes in the network. Although it might seem a bit strange, each mote in a WSN
generally has different consumption, because consumption is related to the number of
external triggers each mote has. Imagine a sensor mote that sends a message every time
a car goes over it, or a sensor mote that sends an alarm when a rock falls. Of course
there are exceptions in which all motes send messages at regular, prefixed intervals of
time. The clearest exception is a water meter that reports consumption in a fixed time
period, independently of external events. But even in this scenario an alarm system can
be built that could make sensor motes consume differently. By defining a protocol that
can balance consumption between motes independently of the application, the lifetime
of the whole network is going to be maximized, therefore leading to reductions in the
number of interventions and its cost.
Until now, we have seen WSNs from a lower level perspective, considering the con-
straints of the sensor motes themselves. But, if seen from a higher level, new concerns
appear. WSNs are able to provide detailed information about the environment in which
they are placed. However, a great amount of information must be distributed and pro-
cessed by constrained resources, and the fact that even though such information can
be easily gathered locally, global access is often necessary. Therefore, it is convenient
to have some middleware that integrates sensor mote access and configuration, thus
making it easier to access from desktop and mobile devices.
Some companies offer a centralized cloud service with a web interface for storing data
coming from WSNs, such as senseiot [11] and ThingSpeak [12]. Their cloud services
can be used to create a private database and store the data coming from the sensors.
Additionally, they provide some visualization tools for analyzing the sensor mote data
as well as a trigger mechanism for performing various actions when pulled. However,
they present some limitations:
• These solutions are cloud-based, so you have to rely on the service of an external
company. In order to use them, the WSN must have an internet connection and
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you cannot create your own cloud.
• In general, the information is private for each user, so it is difficult to get data
from other WSNs.
• There is no standardized way to treat the sensor data. So, even if you could get
data from different WSNs, a complex process is needed to unify all data.
• Two-way communication with sensors is limited. Although some downlink mes-
sages can be sent, they use private protocols. This complicates the remote con-
figuration of sensors.
Other strategies for unifying a common interface exist. From below, IP has been
pushed to the sensor motes to standardize its interface with 6LoWPAN [13]. On top
of that, the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [14] is defined, which enables
motes to talk through a simplified HTTP protocol. In this way, motes can be accessed
in a standard way while two-way communication with a mote is standardized. An
example of a cloud service that uses this technology is thethings.io [15]. Different
implementations exist for running your own CoAP server, such as CoAPthon [16]. Al-
though CoAP can be executed with low overhead in some networks, the overhead is
too high when adding extra headers to the LPWAN with a low bit rate. Additionally,
most of the development is taking place at universities, and the industry has not yet de-
cided if this strategy fits their needs. When you are using industrial sensors you want
to maximize battery life to the extreme, and the overhead is unaffordable when us-
ing these protocols that were originally designed for computers and adapted to sensor
motes. Furthermore, the data coming from sensors is still not standardized. However,
some recent initiatives have emerged for defining an open standard, such as OGC Sen-
sorThings API [17], which builds on Web protocols and the OGC [18] Sensor Web
Enablement standards, while also applying an easy-to-use REST-like style. But they
yet remain neither a public nor a de facto standard. For these reasons an alternative is
needed.
Instead of focusing on cloud services, another interesting approach – and the one cho-
sen in this thesis – is to integrate WSNs with a P2P middleware. Peer-to-peer (P2P)
networks are an efficient method for distributing information in a self-organized man-
ner. In terms of the connectivity of their devices, these networks also provide incredi-
ble benefits, such as scalability and fault-tolerance. For these reasons, we consider that
P2P systems might be a very good fit in some environments.
There are many P2P middlewares, but most of them are designed for a specific appli-
cation. The most common use of P2P technology is for file sharing applications, where
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many protocols can be found, such as bitTorrent [19] or gnutella [20]. There are oth-
ers that implement a distributed hash table, such as Chimera [21] or Freepastry [22].
P2PNS [23] provides a secure distributed name service for P2PSIP. A toolkit for reli-
able messaging is proposed by jgroups [24]. Freedomjs [25] provides a framework for
building P2P web applications. As far as we know, in the few P2P middlewares that are
generic enough to implement any P2P application, the most popular are sip2peer [26]
and JXTA [27].
Sip2peer is an open-source SIP-based middleware for the implementation of any peer-
to-peer application or overlay without constraints on peer nature (traditional PC or
mobile nodes) and specific architecture.
JXTA is an open source P2P protocol specification that is defined as a set of XML
messages, which allows any device connected to a network to exchange messages and
collaborate independently of the underlying network topology. JXTA has a long his-
tory. It was initiated by Sun Microsystems in 2001 and over the years has been the
system of choice for many P2P-based applications, such as a clipboard and a file shar-
ing between different computers [28] as well as a distributed e-learning system [29].
These applications can take advantage of the integration with WSNs. Additionally,
JXTA has a limited version called JXME, which allows less powerful devices such as
mobile phones to access the JXTA network.
Once WSNs are deployed massively, a large part of the real environment where we
live is going to be digitalized. This means that a lot of sensitive information will have
to be managed by an upper platform that collects and process data from many WSNs.
While P2P provides help in distributing the information gathered by WSNs, one thing
that cannot be neglected is its security baseline, since some potentially critical envi-
ronmental information is being exposed to the internet. For instance, the data on your
home power consumption can be used to predict when will be at home, which means
thieves may be able to use that information against you. Therefore, security has to be
taken into account when integrating WSNs to P2P.
On the one hand, adding security to the sensor motes is a great challenge, since they
have limited computational resources to perform the complex mathematical operations
required by most security algorithms. Additionally, because sensor motes are battery-
powered, every extra operation performed to satisfy the security requirements means
shortening their lifetime. On the other hand, the security requirements in the cloud are
not only common end to end encryption. WSNs produce sensitive data, such as peo-
ple’s habits or their health status. Therefore, extra security mechanisms like anonymity
are deemed essential for making this technology viable in certain businesses.
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In summary, the goal of this thesis is twofold: first, to propose some algorithms that
overcome the main limitation of WSNs, i.e., its battery life; second, to propose a secure
integration layer between P2P and WSNs that allows dissemination of the information
gathered by the sensor motes as well as a distributed configuration of them by means
of desktop computers and mobile devices.
1.2 State of the art
This section provides a brief overview of the literature on the two main topics of this
thesis:
• Critical limitations of WSNs that focuses on an efficient schedule mechanism
for TSCH networks with bursty traffic while also balancing the energy spent on
mote communication in a network.
• How to integrate WSNs with P2P, with a focus on the integration layer as well
as security.
1.2.1 Critical limitations in WSNs
In this thesis we focus on lowering and balancing the power consumption of motes
when transmitting data. Specifically, we focus on an efficient schedule mechanism
for TSCH networks with bursty traffic while also balancing the energy spent on mote
communication in a network.
Schedule in TSCH networks
Time-Slotted Channel Hopping (TSCH) networks, such as 802.15.4e [10], use syn-
chronization combined with time-slotted medium access to enable collision-free com-
munication. This slotted structure is also multiplexed in frequency so that it can scale
up communications and improve reliability [30]. The IETF 6TiSCH working group is
currently standardizing IP convergence and control plane management for these net-
works [31].
However, according to RFC7554 [10], a missing component in the TSCH architecture
is an entity in charge of scheduling the TSCH cells for the nodes in the network. This
entity is referred to as “Logical Link Control” (LLC), and it manages and controls the
network schedule.
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The IEEE802.15.4e standard defines the mechanisms for a TSCH node to communi-
cate; 6TiSCH defines the basic configuration [32]. But no standard defines the policy
for computing the communication schedule, for matching that schedule to the multi-
hop paths maintained by the routing protocol, or for adapting the link-layer resources
allocated between neighbor nodes to the data traffic flows.
Several approaches to scheduling TSCH networks have been proposed, though few
of them are implemented in real hardware/software ecosystems. Palattella et. al. de-
veloped TASA [33], a centralized scheduler that calculates optimal schedules at the
cost of intensive signaling. Tinka et. al. [34] developed a decentralized algorithm
for scheduling the network with little requirement for peer-to-peer signaling between
nodes. Morell et. al. [35], developed a hybrid approach with the idea of label-switching
in TSCH networks, and they further propose the use of end-to-end path reservation
signals to transport bandwidth requirements to the nodes. Allocation is done between
parents and children recursively along the path. A similar approach was taken later
by Accettura et. al. [36]. Recently, Duquennoy et. al. presented Orchestra [37], a
best-effort decentralized approach to scheduling the network. Orchestra uses random-
ization to allocate slots without requiring node communication. While the approach
yields 99.999% packet delivery, it does not address bursty traffic.
Therefore, as far as we know, there exists no decentralized scheduler for 802.15.4e
networks that deals with bursty traffic while adding little overhead.
Balancing energy spent on communications
Recent years have seen a growth in research activities that focus on increasing the
lifetime of IoT devices. Optimizing the battery life of multi-hop networks has been a
hot topic, and it has usually been addressed through data aggregation by intermediate
hops [38] or by compressing the packets sent [39]. Data is compressed or aggregated
in each intermediate hop in order to reduce the amount of data sent by radio, which is
the main source of battery drain. Traditional compression algorithms cannot be used
directly because of their complexity. Therefore, simplified algorithms are used.
Another common approach is to use fare routing protocols [40]. These routing proto-
cols not only avoid congestion and maintain connectivity of the network but also take
into account that motes have limited energy. For this reason, when the routing protocol
calculates optimal routes in the network, it also takes into account the energy left in
each mote.
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Another proposal addressed this problem by using a more efficient MAC protocol [41].
In the proposed MAC protocol, a time-out scheme is used instead of a fixed duty cycle.
All messages are grouped and sent in bursts of variable length to increase sleeping
between bursts. It decreases the power consumption in an environment with varying
message rates.
However, few of the presented approaches consider the application itself and how the
monitoring service is provided. Most monitoring applications cover large areas where
different activity zones are observed. Common energy optimization approaches use
the same policies independently of the observed level of activity in a specific area.
Even though, from an individual device standpoint, battery lifetime may be extended
using the described approaches, some devices will still deplete their power quicker
than others.
1.2.2 Securely integrating WSNs with P2P
This section focuses on how to integrate WSNs with P2P. It is divided into two parts,
one centered on the integration layer itself and the other on its security.
Integration layer
The chosen middleware for this integration is JXTA. The reason for choosing JXTA
is because, at the point of beginning this research, it was the most commonly used
P2P middleware due to being mature and interesting for its great functionalities such
as Peer Groups, which is a mechanism for segmenting the global network into smaller
groups of peers.
The latest stable revision of JXTA, version 2.7, became available in May 2011 and in-
corporated several long-awaited functionalities, of which the most relevant are related
to security and simplifying local deployment for the testing stage. JXTA’s development
was stopped for a while due to licensing restrictions. Sun Microsystems began devel-
oping it as an Open Source project for a brief time under a custom license. Then, when
Sun Microsystems was bought by Oracle, the community started to worry about its
future because, in November of 2010, Oracle officially announced its withdrawal from
the JXTA project. For this reason, the JXTA community asked to change the license to
the Apache License 2.0 so they could continue developing the project by themselves
and continue using the JXTA name. But Oracle would not make a decision about what
to do with this project. So the development of JXTA was halted after the 2.7 release. In
August of 2013, Kees Pieters published a series of articles on the DZone community
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website about JXSE (the java implementation of the JXTA protocols) and Equinox (the
engine on which Eclipse runs), which revived enthusiasm in the JXTA community. In
October, it was proposed to start developing a new 2.8 release of the JXSE implemen-
tation of JXTA protocols using the name Chaupal [42] under the Apache v2.0 license.
Its last alpha version is from June of 2015 [43].
There are not many proposals on P2P-WSN integration, but several of them are based
on JXTA. One of the most thorough works may be found in [44]. The authors of this
paper propose a quite complex general purpose architecture (although VANETs are
the main scenario they have in mind) for sensor mote data acquisition over a JXTA
middleware overlay operating on 2.5G/3G mobile devices. This is achieved by heavily
modifying the standard JXTA distribution, thus creating an alternate version. It must be
mentioned that the paper places much more emphasis on the mobile device integration
aspect of the system. Nevertheless, from the perspective of WSN integration, the most
interesting contribution is the design of the XMLSens protocol, which allows sensor
motes to announce their characteristics to the WSN gateway by using XML structures
in a manner that is similar to JXTA’s lower layer protocols.
In [45], JXTA is again the middleware of choice for distributing sensor mote data,
in this case in a healthcare services scenario. Sensor mote data from a Body Area
Network are aggregated using a PDA, which then relies on a JXTA Relay Peer that
acts as a proxy for accessing the P2P network. However, not much emphasis is placed
on the WSN part of the system. What makes this proposal especially relevant in the
context of this literature review is the fact that it is the only approach in which JXTA
Peer Groups are fully considered as a natural method for segmenting the P2P network,
both in terms of efficiency and security.
Sharesense, a P2P environment based on JXTA for monitoring multiple WSNs is pre-
sented in [46]. Its core concept is to rely on integrating JXTA into jWebDust, an
external Java environment. This had been proposed previously by the same authors, as
it allows developing and managing WSN-based applications. Being Java-based, this
environment is easy to integrate with the Java implementation of JXTA. Within the
system’s architecture, it seems to be the one doing the heavy work, as far as sensor
mote data management and access is concerned. Thus, the system can only integrate
sensor mote networks based on this particular environment. Additionally, a Google
Earth-based interface is included in the demo application, allowing precise location of
each sensor mote.
Nevertheless, apart from the specifics of each proposal, some common features are
shared by all of them to some degree. Sensor motes are always considered as resources
to be shared, and two of JXTA’s core services are used mostly to access their data. On
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the one hand, JXTA’s Discovery Service is used to publish and locate available sensor
motes and WSNs, doing so by means of advertisements in the form of XML metadata
documents in order to describe the sensor mote’s characteristics. In that regard, each
proposal provides its own custom-made advertisement structure. On the other hand,
the WSN gateway acts as a single peer in the P2P substrate, relying on JXTA’s Pipe
Service to receive messages from other peers. From a design point of view, this is a
sound and straightforward way to integrate the JXTA middleware into a set of WSNs.
Finally, it is important to note that all but one of the proposals either completely forget
or use in a very rudimentary way another of JXTA’s main architectural features, which
is the one that actually sets it apart from other P2P middlewares: Peer Groups. We
deem taking JXTA Peer Groups into consideration important since they allow peers
with similar capabilities to create a context for peer operation, thus segmenting the
P2P network and facilitating advertisement publication and retrieval.
Secure integration
As stated before, the P2P middleware chosen in this thesis is JXTA. Therefore, all the
analysis and related work are going to be centered on its desktop and mobile versions.
The full specification of JXTA’s capabilities and architectural design can be found
in [27]. A very thorough security survey already exists in [47], so it makes no sense
to repeat it here. In brief, JXTA currently provides an acceptable level of security,
although this security is provided by using a very specific group membership model:
PSE. This has the drawback of using a centralized authorization server. Also, the
survey points out that no mechanism exists for securing messages, especially one that
provides some degree of privacy.
Not many proposals exist in the literature for JXME. First of all, it is necessary to point
out that JXME is divided into two different versions, named Proxied and Proxyless. On
the one hand, the JXME-Proxied version is a very simple implementation for limited
devices, which delegates all the heavy work to an external super-peer, the Relay Peer.
On the other hand, the JXME-Proxyless version is a more complex one, where mobile
peers may directly interact with the JXTA network.
As far as the Proxied version is concerned, Kawulok et al. [48] show a framework
which allows wireless and remote peers to participate in a JXTA network. Authors
describe the most interesting implementation details of the framework as well as all
changes made in the JXTA core and JXME packages. The proposed framework adds
a new authentication scheme based on certificates and PKI [49]. This authentication is
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provided by the Relay Peer, which uses an external Sign and LDAP Server, breaking
completely the P2P model proposed by JXTA.
In regards to the Proxyless version, it is a direct though somewhat simplified port of
JXTA that supports the same protocols and architecture, and therefore proposals that
apply to JXTA also apply to this version.
To sum up, JXTA has a good baseline security level, but it has a security flaw if the ap-
plication requires securing the privacy of its messaging mechanism. JXME-Proxyless
version maintains the same structure as JXTA and therefore can inherit its improve-
ments, such as new security schemes. In contrast, the JXME-Proxied version uses
a simplified protocol and cannot directly inherit security improvements from JXTA.
Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, there is only one authentication proposal
that tries to increase the JXME-Proxied security baseline, although it is provided in a
centralized manner.
1.3 Objectives
The aim of this thesis is to identify the synergies between WSNs and P2P protocols in
order to propose an integration layer between both technologies as well as to improve
some individual weaknesses found in each of them. To this end, the objectives of this
thesis are listed below.
• O1 To propose a solution to some of the limitations found in WSNs
– O1.1 To study and assess the limitations of current WSNs in scheduling
mechanisms for TSCH networks with bursty traffic
– O1.2 To design and implement a scheduling system for TSCH networks
with bursty traffic
– O1.3 To analyze the limitations of current WSN lifetime due to unpredicted
energy consumption
– O1.4 To design and implement a mechanism to increase the lifetime of a
whole WSN
• O2 To propose and implement an integration layer between WSNs and P2P
– O2.1 To develop and test a middleware that allows integration between
WSNs and P2P
– O2.2 To integrate the system securely with mobile devices
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– O2.3 To propose and implement solutions that guarantee a security baseline
1.4 Research methodology
All the work presented in this thesis has followed the scientific method [50]. A sim-
plified version of the process defined by this method can be seen in Figure 1.1, and is
composed of the following steps:
• A question has to be posed in the context of existing knowledge.
• A hypothesis has to be formulated as a tentative answer.
• Predictions have to be made as well as consequences deduced.
• The hypothesis has to be tested in the new field. If minor contradictions are
found, the hypothesis has to be adjusted. In case of finding major discrepancies,
the hypothesis must be redefined.
• Hypothesis is accepted as provisionally true if no contradictions are found in
previous steps.
The specific research methodology used for each contribution follows. This includes
the specific data collection methods employed as well as the tools used for the data
analysis.
1.4.1 Schedule in TSCH networks
Regarding TSCH network schedules, both theoretical and practical research methods
were used. The former was used to choose a well known mechanism to reduce con-
sumption in networks with bursty traffic, while the latter was employed to test the
performance of the implemented algorithm and adjust it.
The data collection methods and tools utilized are:
FIGURE 1.1: Diagram describing the scientific method
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• A mathematical evaluation was carried out to determine whether the proposed
solution would give the expected result.
• The OpenSim emulator of the OpenWSN project [51] was used to simulate a
WSN and store logs with the behavior of the network.
Additionally, two tools were used for data analysis: pandas [52] and the jupyter note-
book [53]. Pandas is a python data analysis library that provides a useful set of analysis
tools that help evaluate the log files and extract results. The jupyter notebook is a tool
that allows easy visualization of data, and it stores both the obtained results and the
tests that were performed.
1.4.2 Balancing energy spent on communications
In terms of balancing energy spent on communications, theoretical research was first
carried out to establish which mechanisms can be applied for distributing the consump-
tion in a network. Second, practical research was used to test and tune the developed
algorithms as well as to check their performance.
The data collection methods and tools used are:
• Information on parking events was generated by Fastprk sensors in a real World-
sensing installation, which was then extracted from their database by means of
common tools provided by the database engine.
• A network simulator developed by Worldsensing was used to test the consump-
tion of the sensor motes, depending on the algorithm used. Log files were ob-
tained for the step by step consumption of each mote.
• A mathematical evaluation was carried out to determine whether the proposed
solution would give the expected results.
To analyze the data, some tools provided by Worldsensing were used along with Mat-
lab [54] scripts.
1.4.3 Integration layer
Concerning the integration layer, theoretical research was followed to determine how
to perform the integration layer. The architectures of both JXTA and P2P were ex-
amined to determine the best integration. Additionally, other integration layers were
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studied to learn from their designs. Therefore, this part involved most of the informa-
tion being extracted by reviewing documentation and source code.
Finally, the practical methodology was also employed in order to build a proof of
concept of this integration layer.
1.4.4 Secure integration
Regarding the secure integration, the first part consisted of theoretical research. This
was used to find out the weaknesses of integrating JXTA with WSNs as well as which
protocols could be used to mitigate these weaknesses.
The second part consisted of practical research. In this part, the algorithms were im-
plemented and tested in real devices. A final step adjusted different parameters in each
algorithm in order to obtain the best performance.
The data collection methods were mainly logs of the execution of the programs. Fol-
lowing that, spreadsheets were used to perform data mining.
1.5 Structure of the Thesis
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, an overview of the main
contributions is provided. Chapter 3 concludes this thesis by presenting the obtained
achievements and describing lines that have been opened for future research. Finally,
Appendixes A, B, C, D and E contain copies of the five main articles used in this
contribution.
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Chapter 2
Contributions of the Thesis
2.1 Distributed PID-based Scheduling for 6TiSCH Net-
works
M. Domingo-Prieto, T. Chang, X. Vilajosana, T. Watteyne, (2016). “Distributed PID-
based Scheduling for 6TiSCH Networks”. in IEEE Communication Letters. vol. 10,
no. 5, pp. 1006-1009. doi: 10.1109/LCOMM.2016.2546880. IF: 1.291, Q2: 34/82.
Category: TELECOMMUNICATIONS.
The full text of this paper is available in Appendix A.
Abstract
Industrial low power networks are becoming the nexus of operational technologies and
the Internet thanks to the standardization of networking layer interfaces. One of the
main promoters of this shift is the IETF 6TiSCH WG, which addresses network man-
agement and IP integration of Time Synchronized Channel Hopping (TSCH) networks
as those developed by the IEEE802.15.4 TG. The 6TiSCH WG is defining the oper-
ational interface and mechanism by which the network schedule can be distributed
amongst the devices in the network. This operational sub-layer, called 6top, sup-
ports distributed scheduling and enables implementers to define the scheduling policy,
only standardizing the distribution mechanism. This letter proposes a novel distributed
scheduling policy based on the well-known industrial control paradigm referred as Pro-
portional, Integral and Derivative (PID) control. The proposed technique is completely
decentralized, enabling each node to determine the number of cells to schedule to one
another, according to its traffic demand. The mechanism is reactive to sudden or bursty
traffic patterns, while staying conservative in over-provisioning cells.
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2.2 JXTAnonym: An anonymity layer for JXTA ser-
vices messaging
M. Domingo, J. Arnedo, (2012). “JXTAnonym: An anonymity layer for JXTA ser-
vices messaging“. in IEICE Transactions on Information and Systems. vol. E95-D,
no. 1, pp. 169-176. issn: 0916-8532. IF: 0.218, Q4: 129/132. Category: COMPUTER
SCIENCE, INFORMATION SYSTEMS.
The full text of this paper is available in Appendix B.
Abstract
With the evolution of the P2P research field, new problems, such as those related with
information security, have arisen. It is important to provide security mechanisms to
P2P systems, since it has already become one of the key issues when evaluating them.
However, even though many P2P systems have been adapted to provide a security
baseline to their underlying applications, more advanced capabilities are becoming
necessary. Specifically, privacy preservation and anonymity are deemed essential to
make the information society sustainable. Unfortunately, sometimes, it may be difficult
to attain anonymity unless it is included into the system’s initial design. The JXTA
open protocols specification is a good example of this kind of scenario. This work
studies how to provide anonymity to JXTA’s architecture in a feasible manner and
proposes an extension which allows deployed services to process two-way messaging
without disclosing the endpoints’ identities to third parties.
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2.3 jxSensor: a sensor network integration layer for
JXTA
M. Domingo-Prieto, J. Arnedo-Moreno, and X. Vilajosana-Guillén, (2012). “jxSen-
sor: a sensor network integration layer for JXTA”. in 2012 15th International Con-
ference on Network-Based Information Systems (NBiS-2012), pp. 435–440. doi:
10.1109/NBiS.2012.125. IEEE Press. Indexed in SCOPUS.
The full text of this paper is available in Appendix C.
Abstract
Nowadays, Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) are already a very important data source
to obtain data about the environment. Thus, they are key to the creation of Cyber-
Physical Systems (CPS). Given the popularity of P2P middlewares as a means to ef-
ficiently process information and distribute services, being able to integrate them to
WSN’s is an interesting proposal. JXTA is a widely used P2P middleware that al-
lows peers to easily exchange information, heavily relying on its main architectural
highlight, the capability to organize peers with common interests into peer groups.
However, right now, approaches to integrate WSN’s to a JXTA network seldom take
advantage of peer groups. For this reason, in this paper we present jxSensor, an in-
tegration layer for sensor motes which facilitates the deployment of CPS’s under this
architecture. This integration has been done taking into account JXTA’s idiosyncrasies
and proposing novel ideas, such as the Virtual Peer, a group of sensors that acts as a
single entity within the peer group context
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2.4 Balancing Power Consumption in IoT Devices by
Using Variable Packet Size
M. Domingo-Prieto, B. Martinez, M. Monton, I. Vilajosana-Guillen, X. Vilajosana-
Guillen, J. Arnedo-Moreno, (2014). “Balancing Power Consumption in IoT Devices
by Using Variable Packet Size”. in Complex, Intelligent and Software Intensive Sys-
tems(CISIS14), pp. 170-176. doi: 10.1109/CISIS.2014.25. IEEE Press. Indexed in
SCOPUS.
The full text of this paper is available in Appendix D.
Abstract
Currently, IoT devices are becoming more and more popular, being deployed in differ-
ent scenarios such as monitoring the power consumption of a house or the state of an
outdoor parking spot. These networks tend to be densely populated by a huge amount
of sensors that send really short messages. Given these characteristics, their main prob-
lem is the great variability and unpredictability of battery lifetime, when they cannot
be plugged to a power outlet. In this paper, we analyze the mote behavior on a real IoT
network and use the extracted data to propose a mechanism to distribute the power con-
sumption more equally between all motes, regardless the number of messages each one
sends. This new proposal decreases the numbers of interventions required to replace
batteries, minimizing costs and increasing network lifetime.
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2.5 Towards secure mobile P2P applications using JXME
M. Domingo, J. Arnedo, J. Herrera, and J. Prieto, (2012). “Towards secure mobile P2P
applications using JXME“. in Journal of Internet Services and Information Security.
vol. 2, issue. 1/2, Pág. 1-21. issn: 2182-2069
The full text of this paper is available in Appendix E.
Abstract
Mobile devices have become ubiquitous, allowing the integration of new information
from a large range of devices. However, the development of new applications requires
a powerful framework which simplifies their construction. JXME is the JXTA imple-
mentation for mobile devices using J2ME, its main value being its simplicity when
creating peer-to-peer (P2P) applications on limited devices. On that regard, an issue
that is becoming very important in the recent times is being able to provide a secu-
rity baseline to such applications. This paper analyzes the current state of security in
JXME and proposes a simple security mechanism in order to protect JXME applica-
tions against a broad range of vulnerabilities.
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Chapter 3
Conclusions and future work
This chapter summarizes the achievements of this thesis by detailing how the originally
proposed objectives have been accomplished. As a result of this research, various im-
portant contributions for improving WSNs have been proposed: at low levels with
protocols that focus on energy consumption, and at high levels by designing an inte-
gration layer between WSNs and P2P to ease and secure information dissemination.
Finally, the lines of research opened up by this thesis are outlined.
3.1 Thesis achievements
This section details how the results presented in the different contributions match the
objectives of this thesis.
3.1.1 O1.1. To study and assess limitations of current WSNs in
scheduling mechanisms for TSCH networks with bursty traf-
fic
In [55], we explained one of the current limitations with WSNs, which is that most of
them use internal proprietary protocols to handle the communication network, which
means that there is no common means for taking the data gathered by the sensors
and providing it to outside networks. In this direction, the IETF 6TiSCH Working
Group is currently defining the architecture that enables the convergence of IPv6 and
low-power industrial deterministic networks. At its core, there is a management layer
called 6top [56], which is in charge of handling and managing the underlying MAC
layer resources. 6top displays clear management interfaces and mechanisms so that
distributed management entities can operate the network. Scheduling policies are left
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open to implementers, enabling vendors to develop their optimal solutions while still
being standards-compliant.
According to the 6TiSCH minimal configuration [32], any 6TiSCH node must provide
one shared slot to bootstrap and advertise the network. Once a node has joined the net-
work, it uses that slot to agree on a schedule with its neighbor. The 6top sublayer is in
charge of handling slot reservation requests between neighbors, i.e., it installs the slots
required by the schedule in its own node as well as its target neighbor. 6top contains
an algorithm, called Scheduling Function (SF), which triggers when to add/delete one
or more cells to a neighbor. The SF can pre-provision extra cells to cope with sudden
bandwidth increases without loosing packets. Similarly, the SF can monitor the perfor-
mance and utilization of each cell and possibly relocate the cell within the schedule in
the case that it detects collisions happening in that cell. The SF uses local information
to take decisions about the schedule. The problem is that the SF is a really critical
part, because it affects the performance of the network as well as the consumption of
its participants (i.e., the sensor motes), but there is no unique implementation that can
fit all scenarios. Since this function is open to being customized for each application,
there is a need to design an SF that fits the requirements of current applications.
3.1.2 O1.2. To design and implement a scheduling system for TSCH
networks with bursty traffic
In order to overcome the limitations of WSN global connectivity and fill the gap that
the IETF 6TiSCH WB has left open for development, we presented in [55] a distributed
and efficient scheduling policy for networks with bursty traffic. This policy is based
on the well-known industrial control paradigm referred to as Proportional, Integral and
Derivative (PID) control, and it uses the 6top management layer being standardized at
the IETF. We use this policy to drive the communication schedule in a TSCH network,
doing so in a distributed manner. We demonstrate that with PID scheduling, a node
in the network dynamically manages the TSCH schedule of its neighbors without re-
quiring a central management entity or network-wide information. The mechanism is
reactive to sudden or bursty traffic patterns while remaining conservative about over-
provisioning cells.
A PID controller is a well-known control loop feedback mechanism used for stabilizing
industrial control loops. Error minimization is performed by adjusting the process
variables according to the current state and the desired end point. The further off-target
the process variable is, the more aggressively the PID controller corrects it.
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The objective of the mechanism is twofold: (1) keep a low (or zero) number of packets
in the queue; (2) minimize the number of cells allocated in the node’s schedule in order
to reduce unnecessary energy consumption.
We implemented the PID scheduling controller in the OpenWSN project [51]. Open-
WSN is an open-source implementation of a standards-based protocol stack, which
includes IEEE802.15.4e TSCH, 6LoWPAN, RPL, CoAP and the latest IETF 6TiSCH
standards.
In our experiments, we aimed to evaluate the performance of the PID scheduler under
constant and bursty traffic and compared it to a well-known state of the art mechanism
referred to as Orchestra [37].
In Fig. 3.1, the duty cycle of a network with a static schedule (Orchestra) is compared
to the PID scheduler. In the experiment, we use bursts of 8 packets/slotframe during 3
slotframes every 50 slots for a three-node network. Three different cases are considered
while following the Orchestra approach: Receiver oriented (Rx cells), Sender oriented
(Tx cells) and Relay schedules (Both Tx and Rx cells). The static scheduler has been
configured to deal with that burst by using a fixed capacity of 8 dedicated slots per
slotframe according to the evaluated case (Tx, Rx or Relay). The figure presents the
duty cycle per slotframe according to the node’s role (Sender, Receiver or Relay). At
the top, we see the overhead caused by the signaling of the PID, which causes a slightly
higher duty cycle that tends to zero as the traffic demand decreases. In this case,
the static schedule configuration slightly outperforms the PID scheduler on average,
as transmission cells are not used if queues are empty; thus, the PID introduces an
overhead to remove them from the schedule. However, as indicated in the middle and
bottom figures, which show the receiver and relay oriented measurements, the PID
removes Rx cells that are not used after a burst, thus saving the nodes to idle-listen in
those slots. Averages are indicated by dotted lines for the three cases, showing that the
PID approach outperforms static scheduling in terms of duty cycle when the network
activity has a bursty nature.
We demonstrate that a PID schedule is able to cope with different types of traffic and
react autonomously to sudden demand variations, doing so by targeting the stabiliza-
tion and minimization of cells in the schedule and the queue. In most of the cases,
this schedule outperforms the current state of the art mechanisms, which is going to
increase the lifetime of motes in a WSN with bursty traffic.
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FIGURE 3.1: Duty cycle comparison between the transmission-
oriented, sender-oriented and relay scenarios during a burst. Average
traffic in dotted lines.
3.1.3 O1.3. To analyze current WSNs lifetime limitations resulting
from unpredicted energy consumption
In [57], we analyzed the global battery consumption of a real IoT network deployment.
The analysis revealed that not all motes behave in the same way inside a network.
Some motes send messages more often than others, which results in having motes with
different power consumption and battery lifetime.
Differences in battery usage across the same network become a major factor if we take
into account that battery replacement interventions must be scheduled. In that regard,
it must be taken into account that each intervention costs money and time. Further-
more, in some scenarios such as smart cities, it may actually become inconveniently
bothersome to citizens. In scenarios with large differences in battery usage across
devices, interventions become more complex because only some devices have their
battery replaced and a log must be kept. The interventions must also be frequent, since
the devices which were not replaced will now deplete their batteries sooner. Of course,
it may be possible to just replace all batteries regardless of their power level at each
intervention, but that would be wasteful from both a cost and environmental perspec-
tive. Therefore, in addition to increasing battery life, we consider that it is also very
important to homogenize battery consumption across all devices in order to facilitate
interventions and reduce maintenance costs.
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FIGURE 3.2: Number of messages, distribution per mote
IoT applications can be divided into two groups, depending on how messages are pro-
duced: one where motes report data periodically at fixed intervals; and another where
motes report data asynchronously by reacting to certain triggers. In the latter group,
the consumption of the motes (and, therefore, battery lifetime) depends on the number
of state changes, which can be very different between motes installed at different spots.
In order to quantify this behavior in a real scenario, we collected four months’ worth
of real data from an installation of 500 outdoor parking sensor motes. The data was
provided by one of Wordsensing’s [58] company deployments in a real-life scenario
that controlled the available parking spots on the streets. In Figure 3.2, which shows
the average number of messages that motes send per day, it can be seen how most of
the sensors send between 5 to 15 messages per day. However, some sensors send more
packets, up to 30 packets per day.
From this data, it can be detected how different sensors in a real scenario send differ-
ent numbers of messages, which will result in different battery lifetimes. In order to
quantify how these different numbers of sent messages impact power consumption, a
simulation was run using a power consumption model for WSN devices [59, 60]. This
model was used to calculate Figure 3.3, which shows how battery level decreases as
years pass, depending on the number of messages that a mote sends. The different
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FIGURE 3.3: Mote battery duration, depending on the number of mes-
sages sent
ranges in this figure show the battery charge in 10% increments. More specifically, the
left-most area represents remaining battery percentage that is between 100% and 90%,
and the right-most area is the remaining battery percentage when the charge is between
10% and 0%, i.e., a flat battery.
Taking the maximum and minimum number of messages from Figure 3.2, it can be
seen how the battery will last 10.5 years when sending 5 messages per day, while it
will last only 6 years when sending 30 per day. This means that some interventions to
replace batteries have to be scheduled 6 years after installation, and more interventions
will be required over the next 4.5 years until the batteries of all motes are replaced.
Therefore, one of the main problems in WSNs is the great variability and unpredictabil-
ity of battery lifetime.
3.1.4 O1.4. To design and implement a mechanisms for increasing
the lifetime of the whole WSN
As stated before, one of the main challenges in WSNs is to increase the battery life-
time, for both the motes in particular and the whole network in general, in order to
minimize the great variability and unpredictability of battery lifetime between motes.
To overcome this last problem, we proposed evaluating two mechanisms in [57] in
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FIGURE 3.4: Mote battery duration, depending on the bytes sent
order to distribute the power consumption more equally between all motes, regardless
of the number of messages each one sends. In that regard, we used datasets extracted
from a real smart parking deployment in order to study two approaches: Huffman cod-
ing [61], which is very popular; and address clustering, which is used in other areas to
improve the efficiency of systems.
Both proposals base their functionality on using variable packet size. Motes which are
prone to send messages more frequently will use shorter packets in such a manner that
the overall transmission time (and therefore battery depletion rate due to radio use) will
be similar across the network. The potential impact of this idea is shown in Figure 3.4.
Assuming NMSG is 10, the mote will last more than 10 years when sending messages
of 4 bytes, whereas it will last less than 9 if it sends messages of 12 bytes.
Huffman coding is an entropy encoding algorithm used for lossless data compression.
It uses a variable-length code table for encoding source symbols. Huffman codes are
established by storing the symbols of the alphabet in a binary tree according to their
probability. As the tree is traversed from root to leaf, the code grows in length. Thus,
symbols which occur frequently are stored near the root of the tree and have the shortest
codes. While less frequently used symbols have longer codes.
We used a basic Huffman coder implementation to build a Huffman codification for
our data set in order to demonstrate that a variable packet size is easily implementable.
Figure 3.5 shows the lifetime of motes depending on the number of messages sent
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FIGURE 3.5: Mote battery duration for Huffman encoded messages,
depending on the number of messages sent
when using Huffman encoded messages. The dotted black line is drawn for easy com-
parison with Figure 3.3, and it represents 0% of battery in that figure. The somewhat
more vertical lines, which were theoretically expected, show that the power consump-
tion of all the motes has been slightly balanced. Additionally, it can be seen how the
0% line has moved to the right, meaning that the power consumption of all motes has
decreased. This effect is produced because Huffman coding not only performs variable
encoding but also compression.
From this analysis, we can see that Huffman coding leads to increased lifetime of
the network. However, from our observations, compression in this case rather than
consumption balance seems to play a greater role in the improvements.
Another approach to variable packet size is address clustering. As can easily be seen in
Figure 3.6, natural clustering is possible because nearby sensors have similar behavior.
These clusters can be labeled as having “High”, “Std” or “Low” activity. In order to
reduce the length of the packet, it is possible to perform variable-length source address
encoding for the whole system. In this case, we can redefine the header in order to
store the cluster number (using only 2 bits, i.e., up to 4 clusters), and we can make
the header source address field variable, depending on the size of the cluster and the
cluster to which each sensor belongs.
Figure 3.7 shows the lifetime of motes, depending on the number of messages sent
when using clustering addresses. Again, the dotted black line is drawn for easy com-
parison with Figure 3.3, and it represents 0% of battery in that figure. This new figure
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FIGURE 3.6: Heat map of messages sent
shows how there are three very differentiated sections, which match with the three
kinds of clusters. The top group represents the “High” cluster, the middle represents
the “Std” and the bottom the “Low”.
Additionally, the figure shows how all lines have a similar slope to the original but
are shifted. The top cluster has moved to the right and the bottom cluster has moved
to the left. After applying address clustering, motes that originally had a lifetime of
between 6 to 7 years have moved to the 7- to 8-year range. In contrast, motes that were
originally expected to last between 9 to 10 years now last between 8 to 9 years.
This assessment shows that the lifetime of most power hungry motes is similar in both
cases. However, whereas address clustering shows better power balance, Huffman has
better overall improvements. This is because, in addition to using variable size packets,
Huffman coding also compresses data. However, the implementation of Huffman cod-
ing does not seem to be a trivial task in a real deployment, whereas address clustering
is straightforward.
These results show that address clustering also improves the network lifetime by bal-
ancing the power consumption of motes. In comparison to the Huffman coding ap-
proach, address clustering is much easier to implement and provides similar benefits.
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FIGURE 3.7: Mote battery duration for messages encoded using address
clustering, depending on the number of messages sent
For these reasons, we conclude that using address clustering is the best choice for re-
ducing the number of battery replacement interventions required, thus saving time and
money.
3.1.5 O2.1. To develop and test a middleware that allows integra-
tion between WSNs and P2P
In [62], we presented jxSensor, an abstraction layer that allows JXTA peers to interact
with WSNs. Through this integration, it is possible to provide a feasible solution to
some of the WSN limitations in regards to data processing and dissemination. Our pro-
posal uses novel approaches that set it apart from others, by taking into account JXTA’s
idiosyncrasies and proposing novel ideas such as Virtual Peer, a group of sensors that
acts as a single entity within the peer group context.
First of all, each sensor mote or an aggregation of them can be treated as a single
peer within the context of a peer group, allowing JXTA peers to communicate with
them transparently while maintaining WSN gateway operation completely in the back-
ground. This allows sensor motes to use the versatility offered by JXTA Peer Groups
to segment the network, such as enabling sensor motes to limit their presence to partic-
ular groups or allow different actions, depending on the groups. Most importantly, the
membership of each sensor mote is not restricted by its geographical location, which
3.1. Thesis achievements 33
is the case in the only existing proposal where peer groups are even considered. Sen-
sor motes connected to different gateways can share the same group and thus provide
greater flexibility for JXTA network segmentation. In addition, our approach allows
sensor motes to become members of several groups, not just a single one. Peer groups
are also the main gateway for deploying security in JXTA.
Secondly, an abstraction layer is set in the gateway. This allows incorporating deployed
sensor motes into the JXTA network without modifying its firmware.
Thirdly, two-way communication is permitted, allowing both the reading of data from
the sensor motes and their configuration. Nevertheless, networks with one-way com-
munication (sensor mote to gateway) are also supported, which is very useful in smart
metering scenarios.
Fourth, the concept of Virtual Peer is created. This allows a group of sensor motes to
be seen as a single peer in the JXTA network, which allows integrating a large quantity
of sensors into the WSN without clogging up the JXTA network.
Finally, historic data is stored in the gateway in order to back up the information sent
from the sensor motes and also to reduce readings by the sensor motes, thus optimizing
resource utilization.
The general structure of the jxSensor network is shown at the logical and physical level
in Figure 3.8. This figure serves as an overview of how jxSensor is integrated within the
context of JXTA and WSN layers. The whole P2P-sensor integration layer is executed
in a sensor gateway, which is a specialized hardware that acts as a bridge between
the local WSN environment and external networks such as the internet. This aspect
is imposed by the design of the WSNs. In that regard, on the one hand, applications
which seek to obtain sensor data from the JXTA side of the architecture are executed by
peers in the JXTA Applications layer. On the other hand, the sensor motes at the WSN
side execute ordinary Sensor Apps that capture and send data while also receiving and
executing actions. These actions include changing the configuration of the application
or requesting data from a sensor. In both kinds of applications, their behavior is up to
the developers and does not have to be specific to jxSensor.
The hardware gateway executes the main P2P-WSN integration module, WSNGate-
way, in the JXTA community services layer. As a result, it easily plugs into the stan-
dard distribution of JXTA 2.7 without the need to modify the source code, which would
require the creation of a custom-made version of JXTA. Furthermore, it is not neces-
sary to install a specific client component into the other peers before they can actually
communicate with the sensor motes. Any JXTA Application may interact with the
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FIGURE 3.8: Overview of jxSensor’s modular architecture
WSNGateway module by using the standard JXTA primitives for peer location and
message exchange. The main component of this module is the Virtual Peer.
Virtual Peer acts as a peer entity within the JXTA network on behalf of one or a
group of sensor motes, and it does so by storing and managing all the information an
actual JXTA peer has (for example, a unique JXTA ID, advertisements, etc.). A single
WSNGateway may support several Virtual Peers and, thus, several instances of this
component may be executing concurrently at any given time, each one representing a
separate sensor mote proxy. A set of motes may be managed by using a single Virtual
Peer, which groups all of them together and may be interacted with a single entity.
Thus, configuration commands are applied to all sensor motes at the same time, and
the answer of a query can be resolved by any sensor mote in the group, which allows
distribution of energy consumption.
At the lower level layer, the MoteAdapter service is a pluggable component which
acts as the abstraction layer that translates queries to the actual protocols accepted by
Sensor Apps deployed in the WSN. This is one of the most important modules, as it
decouples the primitives processed by the MoteAbstraction component and the sensor
motes. The implementation of the MoteAdapter service is specific for every WSN
protocol and application used, making it highly flexible since all the heavy work falls
on the gateway instead of each sensor mote.
To sum up, jxSensor was developed by providing an integration layer between WSNs
and P2P. In this integration, sensor motes are treated as normal peers from the view-
point of the other peers, but all their extra work is performed by the Relay Peer. This
provides full capabilities to the integrated sensor motes without their having to spend
extra energy.
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3.1.6 O2.2. To integrate the system securely with mobile devices
JXTA has a mobile version called JXME. This version provides direct integration of
mobile devices into the JXTA network. Therefore, in any system that uses JXTA, such
as jxSensor [62], the integration layer we have developed between WSNs and JXTA
can be used directly.
However, due to the restrictions of mobile devices, the JXME-Proxied version was de-
veloped using a special protocol between the mobile phone and its Relay Peer in the
JXTA network. Therefore, this protocol has to be evaluated to ensure that it has a secu-
rity baseline and there is no compromise of the information exchanged between mobile
devices and the Relay Peer, as compromising this connection is going to compromise
the whole system.
There were a few minor contributions trying to improve the security baseline of JXME-
Proxied, but as far as we know there were not any that analyzed the current security
provided. Therefore, in [63] we carried out a complete security analysis of JXME-
Proxied. This assessment focuses on the communications between the Proxied and
Relay Peer while also taking into account the way a Relay Peer stores and manages its
subscribed Proxied Peers data. All communications between the Relay Peer and the
rest of the JXTA network operate under the standard JXTA security model.
This analysis takes into account common attacks by categorizing them either as passive
attacks, in which the attacker simply monitors peer activity and network traffic, or
active attacks, in which the attacker purposely interferes with data or network activity.
Passive attacks which have been considered are Eavesdropping and Traffic analysis.
The former consists of searching for sensitive information such as passwords in mes-
sage exchanges, whereas the latter analyses traffic data looking for patterns and rele-
vant peers.
Active attacks include Spoofing, Man-in-the-middle, Replay, Local data alteration and
Software security flaws. Spoofing consists of impersonating another peer. Man-in-the-
middle (MitM) intercepts the communications between two parties by transparently
relaying forged messages to each one. Replay captures messages so that they can be
reused at a later time to simulate a real message exchange initialization. Local data al-
teration modifies local data to corrupt system behavior. Finally, Software security flaws
exploit vulnerabilities due to bugs in the source code by trying to obtain unexpected
actions in the software.
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Op./Threat Evs TAn Spf MitM Rp LDA SFF
Startup V(2) N/A V(4) V(2, 4) N/A V(1) P(OSS)
P(TGMS) P(TGMS)
Join V(2) V(3) V(4) V(2, 4) N/A N/A P(OSS)
P(TGMS) P(TGMS)
Publish/ V(2) V(3) V(4) V(2, 4) V(4) N/A P(OSS)
Discover
Messaging V(2) V(3) V(4) V(2, 4) V(4) N/A P(OSS)
Disconnect V(2) V(3) V(4) V(2, 4) N/A N/A P(OSS)
N/A: Non-applicable.
TABLE 3.1: JXME-Proxied peer operation cycle security summary
The standard JXME-Proxied peer general operation cycle can be summarized in the
following stages: Platform startup, Peer Group joining, Resource discovery and pub-
lication, Message exchange and Disconnection. The security analysis follows the ac-
tions performed by a Proxied Peer according to this lifecycle.
The analysis of possible attacks and the existing security mechanisms of JXME-Proxied,
as classified by peer operations, provides a vulnerability map that is summarized in Ta-
ble 3.1.
The four main vulnerabilities found are:
• V(1): malicious executable code can easily be built and cannot be automatically
discovered when installed
• V(2): no encryption mechanism exists
• V(3): no data flow masquerading mechanism exists
• V(4): no real authentication is enforced
The available security mechanisms are:
• P(OSS): Open Source Project
• P(TGMS): Trusted Group Membership Service [64]
In analyzing the current JXME-Proxied security, it was found that the security baseline
provided by JXME-Proxied was not enough to secure standard mobile applications.
This is because the current version is vulnerable to a wide range of attacks. How-
ever, some attacks can be prevented by simple schemes that extend the basic protocols
used in JXME-Proxied and thus add only a bounded complexity. In [63], we presented
JXME-PLAuth (JXME-Proxied Light Authentication), a proposal to avoid Spoofing
and Replay attacks. This proposal does not try to solve every single vulnerability which
was identified, as this would require a much broader set of security mechanisms, but it
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FIGURE 3.9: Hash-chain creation
provides initial protection to communication by guaranteeing lightweight authentica-
tion. This is the first step in providing a secure mobile framework for JXME-Proxied.
Protection against Spoofing and Replay attacks may be obtained by securely identi-
fying the Proxied Peer using any well known authentication scheme. Our proposal
relies on a lightweight scheme, since the constrained resources of devices where Prox-
ied Peers are executed must be taken into account. For that reason, protection against
Spoofing and Replay is obtained not by linking messages to a particular peer identity
but by guaranteeing that, given a set of messages, all of them come from the same
source peer, whichever that source might be. Thus, once an identifier is assigned, it
can be guaranteed that no intruder is able to insert false messages by impersonating the
source peer. To achieve such a goal, we propose using a hash-chain based scheme to
create a set of linked values which will be used as local identifiers.
Therefore, we propose adding a security extension to the basic PeerId generation pro-
tocol at the platform startup stage in order to prevent attacks regarding authenticity at
every stage in a peer’s lifecycle.
Instead of obtaining a PeerId from the Relay Peer, Proxied Peers themselves generate
a sufficiently long hash-chain (taking into account available resources), as can be seen
in Figure 3.9. Starting with hn(s), each intermediate value of the hash-chain is used as
its PeerId in each successive message exchange with its associated Relay Peer. In this
way, the PeerId attached to a message changes for each successive message in such a
manner that a potential hacker cannot predict it. However, as shown in Figure 3.10,
the Relay Peer will be able to easily track identifier changes and recognize each mes-
sage as originating from the same source. Internally, the Relay Peer stores a local
translation table in order to translate local PeerIds to those of JXTA. Using a changing
PeerId allows us to use exactly the same original protocol format, without any need for
additional fields.
When a hash-chain is about to reach s or expire, a new one must be generated and its
initial value refreshed at the Relay Peer in order for the new hash-chain values to be
used. s will be used as the PUUID part of the PeerId in the refresh message. To allow
this process, the set of operations that a Proxied Peer can perform by using HTTP-GET
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FIGURE 3.10: Hash-chain consumption and identifier translation
is extended with a renew command. This new parameter is used to announce a refresh
in the hash-chain, which contains the new Id as its associated parameter.
As mentioned before, the proposed approach avoids Spoofing and Replay attacks. Fur-
thermore, this proposal minimizes the modifications of the JXME-Proxied protocols,
since no additional request type is defined. The renew command piggybacks on any
other naturally occurring request, such as a listen request, in the same way as an addi-
tional parameter, and it will be processed along with the original request. Therefore,
there is no need to send a single message for the sole purpose of transmitting hash-
chain data, thus reducing overhead by taking advantage of existing transmissions.
Additionally, as no refresh is needed, the secure scheme does not impact even the
HTTP-GET protocol because the peer identifier field is used invisibly instead of with
additional message element types.
Some real experiments were performed in order to test how the proposed security im-
provement to the JXME-Proxied framework impacts its overall behavior. The results
showed that the overhead produced by utilizing security is generally low. Some over-
head was expected to occur as a result of some security measures being used.
Therefore, a lightweight authentication scheme has been designed and implemented
for JXME-Proxied, thus guaranteeing a security baseline for mobile applications that
use JXTA. This ensures secure integration between mobile phones and jxSensor.
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FIGURE 3.11: JXTAnonym service operation in the context of JXTA’s
architectural design.
3.1.7 O2.3. To propose and implement solutions that guarantee a
security baseline
An extensive survey on the security of JXTA exists in [47]. One of its conclusions was
that JXTA did not provide any mechanisms for anonymity. Privacy preservation and
anonymity are deemed essential in maintaining a sustainable information society, but
unfortunately it may sometimes be difficult to attain anonymity unless it is included
in the system’s initial design. When accessing real data from WSNs, anonymity is
required in many use cases. For example, when providing the consumption of one’s
home to an external service, the consumer would not want to be identified because that
information could be used to predict when they are not home.
It is for these reasons that in [65] we developed JXTAnonym, an anonymity layer for
JXTA services messaging. Its general architecture is summarized in Figure 3.11.
The proposed layer is based on a popular approach within the context of P2P appli-
cations: onion routing [66]. However, it is specifically adapted to the idiosyncrasies
of JXTA by taking advantage of service access mechanisms that are already provided
by the platform rather than defining additional protocols. In addition, it minimizes the
number of changes required on an existing system in order to integrate anonymous
messaging. In that manner, peers which support anonymity may coexist with those
who do not, without incompatibilities.
This new mechanism allows bidirectional message exchanges when accessing services
using the JXTA protocols. JXTAnonym provides consumer and provider anonymity in
any JXTA service access. The anonymity service has been implemented as a standard
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JXTA service, and any JXTA Peer which belongs to a PSE Peer Group can use it.
This restriction is necessary because a valid pair of public-private keys are required for
implementing onion routing.
Apart from the fact that JXTA currently does not provide anonymous messaging by
itself, the main contributions of the chosen approach are twofold. First, the tests per-
formed on JXTAnonym demonstrate that anonymity is feasible in JXTA. Although the
time spent on consuming a service increases when using JXTAnonym, this amount is
not so high if we take into consideration the amount of connections which are per-
formed and the fact that encryption is employed. Second, JXTAnonym is completely
invisible to end services and clients in terms of processing the received data. Their
internal operation stays the same whether anonymity is used or not.
These contributions are founded mainly on the fact that JXTAnonym is built over
simple JXTA elements, such as Pipe Service, Discovery Service or advertisements.
This allows using JXTAnonym without modifying the JXTA binary release, since no
new JXTA protocols are defined. Moreover, Peer Group members can freely choose
whether or not they want to belong to the anonymity set within the peer group. Obvi-
ously, the higher the number of peers who decide to use JXTAnonym, the higher the
degree of anonymity.
To sum up, an anonymity mechanism has been defined for JXTA, thus allowing the
sharing of sensitive data, such as that originating from WSNs, without the risk of being
exposed.
3.2 Future work
This section presents the lines of research that remain open, specifically in regards to
the different areas treated in this thesis.
In the area of extending WSN lifetime, our idea of variable packet size packets can be
analyzed in other applications and tested in the field. Additionally, with the appear-
ance of new LPWAN radios, new protocols and standards are also springing up. Our
approach to improving the consumption of WSNs with radio burst patterns in 6TiSCH
can be integrated into new protocols. Also, new protocols can be implemented to ad-
dress other traffic patterns, which really depends on the application. Once the perfor-
mance requirements are achieved, new challenges related to security will arise, since
the data coming from sensors could be really sensitive. One issue that must arguably
be analyzed is the question of ensuring anonymity. To achieve this end, an approach
that is similar to our JXTAnonym proposal can be implemented in 6TiSCH networks.
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In regard to the integration between a WSN and JXTA, the proposed solution called
jxSensor can be implemented and tested in a real scenario. Thanks to the MoteAdapter
service, already deployed installations can be easily integrated. This component can
also be modified to use newer messaging protocols like MQTT or XMPP, which could
be useful for sensors that implement them directly or to decouple the different pieces
of jxSensor that run in the gateway. Other future plans are: a study on how to improve
the association procedure that allows the usage of credentials and secure Peer Groups;
the creation of an application to monitor sensor mote information from a mobile phone
using JXME; and finding ways to replicate historic data between different gateways in
order to improve its availability.
Some further research can be conducted on JXTA security. The anonymity layer pro-
posed for JXTA can be extended to publishing and retrieving Advertisements, as well
as to providing anonymous multicast communications. Also, it is worth studying how
to apply mechanisms that thwart global attackers. In the JXME security proposal, addi-
tional mechanisms can be provided to secure against other attacks rather than Spoofing
and Replay. However, the task is expected to be difficult, since the obtained solutions
must be consistent with the constrained computational environment of a Proxied Peer
device. Another possibility is to use the proposed security scheme in new protocols.
Finally, in the field of integration between P2P and WSNs, there is great potential in
continuing to explore new ideas. Once WSNs are deployed in new scenarios, more
different data will have to be handled efficiently by a distributed system.
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Distributed PID-based Scheduling
for 6TiSCH Networks
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Abstract—Industrial low power networks are becoming the
nexus of operational technologies and the Internet thanks to
the standardization of networking layer interfaces. One of the
main promoters of this shift is the IETF 6TiSCH WG, which
addresses network management and IP integration of Time
Synchronized Channel Hopping (TSCH) networks as those de-
veloped by the IEEE802.15.4 TG. The 6TiSCH WG is defining
the operational interface and mechanism by which the network
schedule can be distributed amongst the devices in the network.
This operational sub-layer, called 6top, supports distributed
scheduling and enables implementers to define the scheduling
policy, only standardizing the distribution mechanism. This letter
proposes a novel distributed scheduling policy based on the well-
known industrial control paradigm referred as Proportional,
Integral and Derivative (PID) control. The proposed technique
is completely decentralized, enabling each node to determine the
number of cells to schedule to one another, according to its traffic
demand. The mechanism is reactive to sudden or bursty traffic
patterns, while staying conservative in over-provisioning cells.
Index Terms—IEEE802.15.4e, 6TiSCH, Wireless Sensor Net-
works, Distributed Network Scheduling, Industrial IoT, TSCH.
I. INTRODUCTION
The IETF 6TiSCH Working Group is defining the archi-
tecture that enables the convergence of IPv6 and low-power
industrial deterministic networks. At its core is a management
layer called 6top which is in charge of handling and managing
the underlying MAC layer resources. Fig. 1 illustrates a Time
Synchronized Channel Hopping (TSCH) network structure.
6top exposes clear management interfaces and mechanisms
so distributed management entities can operate the network.
Scheduling policies are left open to implementers, enabling
vendors to develop their optimal solutions, while still being
standards-compliant.
This letter presents a distributed and efficient scheduling
policy. This policy is based on the well-known Proportional,
Integral and Derivative (PID) control algorithm, which we use
to drive the communication schedule in a TSCH network, in a
distributed manner. We demonstrate that with PID scheduling,
a node in the network dynamically manages its TSCH schedule
to its neighbors, without requiring a central management entity
or network-wide information.
This letter is organized as follow. Section II relates our
work to the current state of the art, and introduces the
scheduling operation in TSCH/6TiSCH networks. Section III
introduces the concept of PID scheduling and its integration
to OpenWSN. Section IV presents the implementation and
evaluation details. Section V concludes this letter.
M. Domingo and X. Vilajosana are with Worldsensing and Universitat
Oberta de Catalunya, Barcelona, Spain.
T. Watteyne is with Inria-Paris, EVA Team, France.
T. Chang is with both Inria-Paris, EVA Team, France and University of
Science and Technology, Beijing, China.
Fig. 1. Example TSCH network. “TxD” stands for “sending to node D”.
“RxD” stands for “receiving from node D”. Cells marked “ADV” are used to
advertise the presence of the network [1].
II. SCHEDULING IN TSCH NETWORKS
A. Related Work
TSCH networks use synchronization combined with time
slotted medium access to enable collision-free communication.
This slotted structure is also multiplexed in frequency to be
able to scale up communications and to improve reliability [2].
The IETF 6TiSCH working group is standardizing IP conver-
gence and control plane management for these networks [3].
According to RFC7554 [1], a missing component in the
TSCH architecture is an entity in charge of scheduling the
TSCH cells for the nodes in the network. This entity is referred
to as “Logical Link Control” (LLC), and manages and controls
the schedule of the network.
The IEEE802.15.4e standard defines the mechanisms for
a TSCH node to communicate; 6TiSCH defines the basic
configuration [4]. No standard defines the policy to compute
the communication schedule, match that schedule to the multi-
hop paths maintained by the routing protocol or adapt the link-
layer resources allocated between neighbor nodes to the data
traffic flows.
Several approaches have been proposed to schedule
TSCH networks, few of them being implemented in real
hardware/software ecosystems. Palattella et. al. developed
TASA [5], a centralized scheduler that calculates optimal
schedules at the cost of intensive signaling. Tinka et. al. [6]
developed a decentralized algorithm to schedule the network,
while requiring little peer-to-peer signaling between nodes.
Morell et. al. [7], developed an hybrid approach with the
idea of label-switching in TSCH networks which proposes
the use of end-to-end path reservation signals to transport
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bandwidth requirements to the nodes. Allocation is done
between parents and children recursively along the path. A
similar approach was taken later by Accettura et. al. [8]. Re-
cently, Duquennoy et. al. presented Orchestra [9], a best-effort
decentralized approach to schedule the network. Orchestra
uses randomization to allocate slots without requiring node
communication. While the approach yields 99.999% packet
delivery, it does not address bursty traffic as is shown later.
B. Network Scheduling in 6TiSCH Networks
According to the 6TiSCH minimal configuration [4], any
6TiSCH node must provide one shared slot to bootstrap and
advertise the network. Once a node has joined the network, it
uses that slot to agree on a schedule with its neighbor. The
6top sublayer is in charge of handling slot reservation requests
between neighbors, i.e. install the required slots in the node
and its target neighbor schedule. 6top contains an algorithm,
called Scheduling Function (SF), which triggers when to
add/delete one or more cells to a neighbor. The SF can pre-
provision extra cells to cope with sudden bandwidth increases
without loosing packets. Similarly, the SF can monitor the
performance and utilization of each cell and possibly relocate
the cell within the schedule in case it detects collisions are
happening on that cell. The SF uses local information to take
decisions about the schedule. The PID-based SF we propose
can be plugged directly into the 6top sublayer.
III. PID SCHEDULING
A PID controller is a well-known control loop feedback
mechanism used for stabilizing industrial control loops. The
error minimization is done by adjusting the process variables
according to the current state and the desired end point. The
further off-target the process variable is, the more aggressively
the PID controller corrects it.
A PID controller is generally defined as in (1), where
et stands for the error between the current state and the
desired objective. et is multiplied by a Kp constant which
is used to fine-tune the process. The integral term of the
PID, controlled by Ki, is used to take into account the error
evolution along time (based on past values) and introduce
certain inertia to the system. This prevents the control to be
reacting proportionally to the immediate error and to maintain
the correction trend according to the previous iterations. The
derivative term, controlled by a Kd constant, provides a sense
of the speed of the error variation (predicts future values of
the error) and works in opposite direction to the integral term
by reducing the inertia.
pt = Kp ∗ et +Ki
∫ t
0
etdt+Kd ∗ d
dt
et (1)
This letter looks at TSCH scheduling as a closed loop
control problem, with the objective to optimize the schedule of
the TSCH network so the number of cells in it accommodates
to the node’s demand. The approach is fully decentralized:
scheduling decisions are taken according to the current state
of the node, without requiring global or partial network
information.
The variables we optimize are the size of the queue and the
number of scheduled slots that are unused in a slotframe. The
PID controller computes the number of required cells in the
schedule, according to the traffic demand on that particular
node. At each slotframe, the PID controller determines the
number of cells that need to be added or removed in a per-
neighbor basis, according to the state of the queues and the
previous slotframes cells usage. For example, if the queue
fills up, the controller determines that more cells in the
schedule are needed. Similarly, if the number of unused cells
increases, the controller decides to remove some of them.
Controlling the inertia of the PID is fundamental to avoid
constants increments/decrements to the slot allocation because
this introduces unnecessary energy consumption and packet
overhead due to unnecessary allocations.
We propose a PID controller which calculates the number of
cells to be scheduled at every start of slotframe, for each of the
possible traffic destinations. The controller is also in charge
of re-scheduling under-performing cells given a configurable
threshold, e.g. if a link has an average Packet Delivery Ratio
(PDR) under the threshold, the cell is relocated after N PID
iterations, with N configurable. Once the controller indicates
the number of cells to add/delete, the 6top protocol [10]
carries out the negotiation and reservation with the neighbor.
The proposed cells are selected randomly from those not
being allocated in the requester’s schedule. The objective of
the mechanism is twofold: (1) keep a low (or zero) number
of packets in the queue, (2) minimize the number of cells
allocated in the node’s schedule in order to reduce unnecessary
energy consumption.
The number of cells to be scheduled per target node (CSj)
is calculated by the PID controller using (2) as a discrete
approximation of (1).
The proportional error of the PID to a particular neighbor
(etj) can be seen in (3) and is calculated by the current number
of packets in queue (Pcj) to that particular neighbor j, minus
the current number of cells in the schedule to that particular
neighbor (Ccj), and minus the target number of packet in
queue (Ptj).
Ptj = 0 is the objective of our PID controller to maintain the
queue empty.
∑nj−1
0 etnj ∗ δSF is the integral of the errors,
that is the sum of the errors in the last N slotframes. δSF
represents the slotframe duration. The last term is a derivative
term that indicates how fast the error changes. In addition, note
that the total number of cells to be scheduled in one iteration
of the PID must not exceed the total schedule capacity as noted
in (2).
CSj = Kp ∗ etj +Ki
n−1∑
0
etnj ∗ δSF +Kd ∗
etj − etj−1
δSF
,
j ∈ source nodes,∑
j
CSj ≤ Total slotframe capacity
(2)
etj = Pcj − Ccj − Ptj (3)
To illustrate, let’s imagine we use Kp = 1. When multiplied
by etj , having the rest of K’s set to zero, we would have
a PID result proportional to the current error. That is, if the
queue is 2 packets too large, the PID result CS is that 2 slots
need to be allocated to the schedule. By reducing the weight
of the proportional error and adding weight to the integral
term, we smoothen the reaction of the controller by restricting
the impact of sudden queue variations as we introduce certain
inertia to the system. Note that Ks are represented as float
values [0..1] that depend on the scheduling objective that
wants to be achieved. Kp weights the proportional term; it
determines the amount of cells to schedule given a certain
error. It is desirable to have one extra cell per extra packet in
the queue; therefore Kp should be close to 1.0 but giving some
space to both the integral term to avoid excess proportionality,
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Fig. 2. Number of cells allocated for constant traffic. Top: results for 300
slotframes. Bottom: zoom on the first 100 slotframes.
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Fig. 3. Number of cells allocated for bursty traffic. Top: results for 300
slotframes. Bottom: zoom on the first 100 slotframes.
and therefore instability, and also to the derivative term. Ki
is used to stabilize the controller, giving weight to the past
actions. Ki depends on the window size and on the speed
of the controller; its value should be approximately δ(SF )n
times smaller than Kp. Finally, Kd breaks the system inertia
as it anticipates future values of the system and should have
a value proportional to the speed of the system.
In the proposed approach, is important to recall that the
6top negotiation protocol does not ensure collision-free al-
locations, but it is the responsibility of the SF to address
under-performing slots. A scheduling collision may cause a
delay of several slots in the allocation procedure. These slots
are dependent on the number of retries. The PID policy is
simple in this case. The PID computes the required cells
according to the current status. If an allocation failed in the
previous attempt, the result of the PID calculation in the
current iteration will be more aggressive to reach the objective
as the system is drifting from it. If we are in the extreme
case that no more cells in the schedule of the counterpart are
available, the queue of the node grows and eventually starts
dropping packets. This behavior is not a PID problem but a
network planning problem as the required bandwidth is larger
than the available bandwidth.
IV. EVALUATION
We implemented the PID scheduling controller in the
OpenWSN project [11]. OpenWSN is an open-source im-
plementation of a standards-based protocol stack, including
IEEE802.15.4e TSCH, 6LoWPAN, RPL, CoAP and the latest
IETF 6TiSCH standards. OpenWSN implements the 6top
sublayer [10]. The PID scheduling controller is a component
that uses the 6top sublayer. Different SFs can be used in
6top to decide when to add/delete cells to each neighbor.
Once the SF decides to add/delete cells, the 6top protocol
locally negotiates with the neighbor. Negotiation occurs using
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Fig. 4. Number of cells allocated for bursty traffic in a mulithop setting (6
hops). Top: For each of the hops, evolution of allocated cells in the schedule.
Bottom: number of packets in the queue evolution at each hop.
pairwise communication between nodes exchanging alloca-
tion requests/responses. The PID controller is an SF which
determines the number of cells that should be scheduled
to a particular neighbor and invokes the corresponding 6top
protocol function to request the cells. 6top is standardized in
such a way that a SF can be plugged-in.
To test the performance of the PID under various types of
traffic, we utilized cstorm application in OpenWSN. This
application enables us to control the packet generation rate
and therefore emulate different scenarios such as those with
constant traffic and others with bursty traffic.
The evaluation aims to demonstrate that the mechanism
is able to dynamically and in a distributed manner manage
the schedule of the network without requiring centralized
information.
A. Description of the test environment
OpenSim is the emulator of the OpenWSN project. It
compiles the firmware running on real nodes as a Python
extension module and enables to run them in a single computer
emulating a real network. The simulated code is exactly the
same as the one that runs on real devices.
The first network built with OpenSim contains two emulated
nodes: node A configured as root node, node B configured as
slave. The slot duration and length of the slotframe of this
network are set to 15 ms and 101 slots long, respectively.
Both nodes use 5 pre-configured shared cells for best effort
and 6top reservation traffic. The cells reserved through 6top
negotiation are dedicated cells between both nodes and hence
without collision. The cstorm application is used to generate
traffic from node B to A. The rate of the traffic is controlled
by manipulating the packet generation interval. The smaller
the interval, the higher the traffic. To accurately test the
performance of the PID controller, cstorm packets are forced
to be sent on reserved cells. All other packets (beacons, routing
signaling traffic, etc.) can only be sent through shared cells.
Only the packets in the queue generated by cstorm and the
6top layer are used for the PID calculation.
The experimental data is obtained at the last slot in the
slotframe. The recorded information for each slotframe con-
sists in a tuple with six elements: the number of scheduled
cells, the number of packets in the queue, the number of sent
packets, the traffic, the average duty cycle for the slotframe
and the error (as et in (3)). The traffic represents the number
of packets generated every slotframe.
A second setting is used to evaluate the performance of the
PID scheduling in a multihop network. We use a 7 node linear
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network, or 6 hops. Only the last node is generating cstorm
traffic. In addition, we limit the number of shared slots to 2
between each pair of nodes, aiming to see more cells being
reserved all along the 6 hops.
B. Experiments
In our experiments, we aimed to evaluate the performance of
the PID scheduler under constant and bursty traffic and com-
pared it to a well-known state of the art mechanism referred
as Orchestra [9]. Two experiments have been conducted with
a predetermined PID configuration with values (Kp = 0.7,
Ki = 0.075, Kd = 0, n = 4). The PID configuration
dependents on the application objective and part of the pre-
deployment adjustment and tuning. We plot the variation of
the number of scheduled cells in the schedule, packets in the
queue, the sent packets and the error, as shown in Fig. 2
and Fig. 3. Fig. 2 presents the cases for constant traffic. For
those, the cstorm packet generation rate is set to 3 packet
every slotframe. Per Fig. 2, the scheduled cells are stable at
3 allocated cells. Despite the fact that packets in the queue
eventually oscillate from 4 to 2, the scheduled cells stay at 3
and do not drop to 2 until the number of packets in the queue
drop to 1; then, when the packets in the queue increase again
the PID reacts in just 2 slotframes to reallocate the 3 slots.
To evaluate a bursty traffic scenario, we use a period of
50 slotframes to generate traffic. During the first 3 of the 50
slotframes, the packet generation rate is set randomly between
3 and 5 packets per slotframe. No packets are generated in
the remaining 47 slotframes. As seen in Fig. 3, every time a
traffic burst occurs, the PID controller allocates the determined
number of cells through the 6top management interface, and
recycle them after the end of the burst within 4 to 5 slotframes
(due to the integral weight and the overhead of the negotiation
protocol). The number of allocated cells is reduced to one after
the end of the burst. At that point, the number of cells to be
removed is less than one; thus, no cell can be removed, and
the allocated cells are kept at one until next traffic burst.
A second experiment, depicted in Fig. 4 presents the
evolution of cell allocations along a multihop path. Only
the leaf node (hop 6) generates traffic using cstorm every
50 slotframes. We can see the filtering effect caused by
progressive allocation of cells (smooth ramp due to inertia
introduced by the PID integral term) which causes the next
hop to require less “extra” slots to relay the traffic as their
queue size grows more progressively.
Finally, in Fig. 5, the duty cycle of a network with a static
schedule (Orchestra [9]) is compared to the PID scheduler.
In the experiment, we use bursts of 8 packets/slotframe
during 3 slotframes every 50 slots for a three-node network.
Three different cases are considered following the Orchestra
approach. Receiver oriented (Rx cells), Sender oriented (Tx
cells) and Relay schedules (Both Tx and Rx cells). The static
scheduler has been configured to deal with that burst using a
fixed capacity of 8 dedicated slots per slotframe according to
the evaluated case (Tx, Rx or Relay). The figure presents the
duty cycle per slotframe according to the node’s role (Sender,
Receiver or Relay). In the top, we see the overhead caused by
the signaling of the PID which causes a slightly higher duty
cycle that tends to zero as the traffic demand decreases. In this
case, the static schedule configuration outperforms in average
slightly the PID scheduler as transmission cells are not used if
queues are empty; the PID introduces an overhead to remove
them from the schedule. However, the middle and bottom
figures, showing the receiver and relay oriented measurements,
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Fig. 5. Duty cycle comparison between the transmission oriented, sender
oriented and relay scenarios during a burst. Average traffic in dotted lines.
indicate that the PID removes Rx cells not being used after
a burst, saving the nodes to idle-listen in those slots. Average
doted lines are provided for the three cases, showing that the
PID approach outperforms static scheduling in terms of duty
cycle when the network activity has a bursty nature.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This letter presents a distributed and efficient scheduling
policy for 6TiSCH networks. This policy is based on the PID
industrial control paradigm and uses the 6top management
layer being standardized at the IETF. The mechanism targets
schedule stabilization for coping with dynamic application
demands in a distributed manner, and uses pairwise commu-
nication between neighbor nodes. We demonstrate that a PID
schedule is able to cope with different types of traffic and
react autonomously to sudden demand variations, targeting
stabilization and minimization of cells in the schedule and
the queue.
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SUMMARY
With the evolution of the P2P research field, new problems,
such as those related with information security, have arisen. It is
important to provide security mechanisms to P2P systems, since
it has already become one of the key issues when evaluating them.
However, even though many P2P systems have been adapted
to provide a security baseline to their underlying applications,
more advanced capabilities are becoming necessary. Specifically,
privacy preservation and anonymity are deemed essential to make
the information society sustainable. Unfortunately, sometimes, it
may be difficult to attain anonymity unless it is included into the
system’s initial design. The JXTA open protocols specification
is a good example of this kind of scenario. This work studies
how to provide anonymity to JXTA’s architecture in a feasible
manner and proposes an extension which allows deployed services
to process two-way messaging without disclosing the endpoints’
identities to third parties.
key words: peer-to-peer, security, anonymity, JXTA, Java,
onion routing.
1. Introduction
Just as the popularity of P2P applications has risen, so
have concerns regarding their security. As P2P applica-
tions move from simple data sharing, for example Bit-
Torrent [1], to a broader spectrum, such as e-learning
environments [2], they become more and more sensitive
to security threats. Therefore it becomes very impor-
tant to design P2P frameworks which not only can be
easily adapted to a broad set of application scopes, but
also take into account an acceptable security baseline.
Under today’s standards, it is expected that it is possi-
ble to deploy some degree of privacy, ensuring that the
contents of a message exchange are not revealed to an
eavesdropper, and authentication, guaranteeing which
is the identity of each endpoint during any message ex-
change.
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As P2P systems evolve and become widespread
in new scenarios, more advanced security capabilities
should be considered. An example of them is message
anonymity [3], allowing a peer to send requests to an
arbitrary service in such a manner that nobody can
determine the endpoints’ identities. The need for this
feature ranges from everyday situations such as a corpo-
rate suggestion box, a peer evaluation form or personal
data sharing [4], to those related to much serious topics,
such as freedom of speech or whistleblowing. Unfor-
tunately, because of its architecture, P2P systems are
specially weak to anonymity attacks unless this capa-
bility is included in the system’s initial design. Even
when providing the aforementioned basic security ca-
pabilities, it may be easy for other peers to acquire in-
formation by monitoring message flows or intercepting
queries routed through them [5]. Consequently, mes-
sage sources and final services are completely exposed
to neighboring peers and super-peers.
JXTA (or ”juxtapose”) [6] is an example of a P2P
system which already considers some basic security ca-
pabilities, but not anonymity. Consisting in a set of
open protocols that enable the creation and deployment
of P2P networks, it provides applications with the ca-
pability to easily discover and observe peers, exchange
messages and publish resources. Even though in its suc-
cessive revisions security mechanisms have slowly crept
in, up to an acceptable degree [7], in its latest version
(2.7RC1), available on January the 12th 2011, no previ-
sions are made about being able to provide any degree
of anonymity some day.
In this paper we extend our previous work in [8]
and present JXTAnonym, an anonymity layer which
allows peers to exchange messages with JXTA services
without disclosing the identity of the participating par-
ties to neighboring peers or super-peers. Thus, anony-
mous two-way messaging is made possible in JXTA.
The proposed layer is based on a popular approach
within the context of P2P applications, onion rout-
ing [9]. However, it is specifically adapted to the id-
iosyncrasies of JXTA, taking advantage of service ac-
cess mechanisms already provided by the platform, in-
stead of defining additional protocols. In addition, the
amount of required changes on an existing system in or-
der to integrate anonymous messaging is minimized. In
that manner, peers which support anonymity may co-
exist with those who don’t, without incompatibilities.
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The paper is structured as follows. In Section
2 we provide a brief summary of the current mecha-
nisms based on onion routing, focusing on those meth-
ods which provide bidirectional messaging capabilities
in P2P networks. Section 3 describes how our base
system has been extended to encompass bidirectional
messaging, suiting to the idiosyncrasies of JXTA ser-
vices. The outcome of our experimental results in or-
der to evaluate its performance is provided in Section 4.
Section 5 provides a security discussion of JXTAnonym.
Finally, Section 6 concludes this paper and outlines fur-
ther work.
2. Related work on onion routing
Anonymity in P2P networks can be achieved using
three different approaches: Unimessage-based, Split
message-based and Replicated message-based. Our work
focuses on the first one, since it is the most popular and
efficient, while maintaining a high degree of anonymity.
Also it assumes that nodes are completely autonomous
[10]. These characteristics mesh with the structure of
JXTA and allows anonymous bidirectional communica-
tions.
A unimessage-based approach, also known as
Onion Routing [9], provides anonymity by sending the
message through a random sequence of proxies before
it reaches the destination. Those proxies are labeled
OnionRouters. Generally, the path of OnionRouters
is pre-constructed by the sender before the message is
sent. The message is repeatedly encrypted in a manner
that, during transit towards the destination, a single
encryption layer can be taken out, one at a time, at
each OnionRouter. Each time a layer is peeled off, the
identity of the next hop is obtained. Thus, at each
hop, an OnionRouter does not know whether the mes-
sage is being sent to another proxy or to the actual
final destination. In the same manner, the destination
peer cannot know whether the received message comes
directly from the source or it has been relayed through
a set of OnionRouters.
The onion routing approach is also able to provide
anonymous two-way communications in two ways:
• Constructing both a query (source to destination)
and response (backwards, destination to source)
onion at the source peer and including it inside
the onion message together with the data to be
sent. Therefore the destination peer, after replying
the query, can forward its reply data to the source
using the response onion path.
• Including a session ID within the onion route,
which is stored on transit, thus creating a kind
of return path virtual circuit [11]. When the des-
tination peer responds the query, the message is
routed back following the established path, but in
the opposite direction.
Onion Routing is used as the core of many
anonymity protocols to achieve providing mutual
anonymity, being APFS (Anonymous P2P File Shar-
ing) [11] and Tor [12] the ones that share more features
when constructing of the anonymous path.
As its name suggests, the APFS protocol is used
for P2P file sharing, providing mutual anonymity of the
initiator and the responder in a connection. In APFS,
each peer has to choose a proxy peer and create a Onion
Route to it. This proxy peer will be the entry point to
the anonymous network for that peer. Additionally,
exists a well known bootstrapping peer called coordi-
nator which maintains a list of all the peers connected
to the network and which are acting as a servers. How-
ever, instead of peers address, their proxy address are
stored.
Tor is a circuit-based anonymous communication
service. The sender’s anonymity is maintained by con-
structing a circuit from the source to an exit node, who
will communicate with the destination. The construc-
tion of this route is performed by incrementally extend-
ing the circuit, hop by hop, and negotiating a different
symmetric key with each intermediate node. This cir-
cuit is periodically recalculated and can be used at its
entire length, or shortened to modify the exit node.
Answers to queries are transmitted through the same
circuit.
Mutual anonymity can be achieved on Tor by us-
ing hidden services. The basic idea of hidden services is
that the service provider is hidden behind some peers
who act as his Introduction Points (IP) while the ser-
vice consumer is behind a Rendezvous Point (RP). The
communication between these points is done by follow-
ing circuits. The steps required to use a hidden service
are:
• The service consumer contacts with one of the IPs,
announcing his RP.
• The IP forwards the message to the service
provider, who will create a circuit to the RP
• At this point, mutual anonymity communication
between both can be established through the RP.
3. A proposal for JXTA anonymous messaging
JXTA provides mechanisms to share services. Such
services are commonly consumed by exchanging bidi-
rectional messages. In order to provide anonymity in
services consumption, is important to inspect the JXTA
messaging architecture. From this review, it is possible
to identify the elements that can be taken advantage
of in order to define an anonymity layer for which is
transparent and finely integrated to JXTA architecture,
without the need of defining additional protocols.
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3.1 JXTA Messaging architecture
In this subsection, we provide an overview of those of
JXTA’s main architectural elements related to our pro-
posal. A detailed explanation can be found in [13].
The main idiosyncrasy in JXTA’s design, which
sets it apart from other P2P frameworks, is introduc-
ing the concept of Peer Group, a segmentation of the
global JXTA network. All peers publish and consume
services within the context of a group, interacting with
each other by using some JXTA core services, the most
important ones being the Discovery Service and the
Pipe Service.
Every resource in a JXTA group is described by
an Advertisement, a metadata document. A resource
cannot be accessed unless its Advertisement is previ-
ously retrieved. Advertisements must be periodically
published, since they expire and are flushed from the
network after some time (by default, 2 hours). The
Discovery Service’s responsibility is managing adver-
tisements, allowing peers to publish and find available
resources. The most important types of Advertisements
are:
• Peer Advertisement : Describes a peer and the re-
sources and services it provides. Each peer is re-
sponsible for the publication of its own Peer Ad-
vertisement, and is considered online only while it
continues to do so.
• Pipe Advertisement : Describes a JXTA Pipe, the
main mechanism in JXTA to exchange data be-
tween two applications or services.
The Pipe Service is responsible for managing mes-
sage exchanges using JXTA Pipes. The simplest pipe in
JXTA, the JxtaUnicast, provides an asynchronous, uni-
directional message transfer mechanism which can be
easily established and managed. Nevertheless, there is
a higher-level communication abstraction provided by
the JxtaBiDiPipe which provides a bidirectional com-
munication channel. The latter is usually preferred by
services, since it allows the direct use of a straight-
forward query-response exchange. The description of
JXTA’s standard service model based on this proce-
dure follows:
1. Each service provider starts a JXTAServerPipe us-
ing the Pipe Service, which exposes and listens to
an input pipe in order to process communication
requests. This input pipe is defined using a Pipe
Advertisement.
2. This Pipe Advertisement is made public by the
service provider using the Discovery Service.
3. The Advertisement is propagated within the group
by Rendezvous Peers, special super-peers who effi-
ciently distribute Advertisements.
4. To consume a service, a peer must retrieve the
Pipe Advertisement (via the Discovery Service)
and then a bidirectional connection must be estab-
lished via the Pipe Service, creating a JxtaBiDiP-
ipe.
5. Once a communication request is received at the
server side, an independent JxtaBiDiPipe is cre-
ated and bound with the request. A message ex-
changes may begin from now on.
Message exchanges can be secured in JXTA by us-
ing a group based on the PSE (Personal Security Envi-
ronment) Membership Service. Under this kind of peer
group, each peer is provided with a credential based
on PKIX [14] certificates. This guarantees that each
peer has initialized a valid pair of public-private keys
and that the public key of each peer is automatically
distributed inside its Peer Advertisement, in a special
service parameter entry.
3.2 Anonymizing procedure
We propose an anonymity layer that causes the min-
imum interferences on the JXTA messaging architec-
ture, according to the review done in Section 3.1. JX-
TAnonym, an anonymizing service, is deployed in those
peer group members which want to anonymously ex-
change messages, creating an anonymous subnetwork
within the context of a peer group. Group members
may freely join and leave this network.
The proposed service is tailored to JXTA’s core
services features, such as invisible publication, discov-
ery and access to services (via the Discovery Service),
message management via the Pipe Service and usage
of the PSE secure environment for cryptographic data
generation and distribution. Therefore, the deployment
procedure follows the same steps as for any other peer
service, making use of JXTA’s service model without
the need of modifying JXTA’s initial design.
The service’s anonymity mechanism is based on an
onion routing approach, examined in detail in Section 2,
protecting the identity of end clients (consumers) and
services (providers) from the rest of the group mem-
bers. In addition, the end service is also unable to es-
tablish the end client’s identity. Its general architecture
is summarized in Figure 1.
The execution of JXTAnonym in any peer encom-
passes three different steps: JXTAnonym Service Pub-
lication, Message Setup and Message Processing.
3.2.1 JXTAnonym Service Publication
Just like any other JXTA service, an instance of the
JXTAnonym service in a peer group member listens
to incoming queries using an input pipe. This pipe is
made available to other peer group members by period-
ically publishing its Pipe Advertisement, via the Dis-
covery Service. However, we propose that Pipe Adver-
tisements are not published as standalone documents.
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Fig. 1 JXTAnonym service operation in the context of JXTA’s
architectural design.
They are piggybacked inside the service parameters sec-
tion of the Peer Advertisement, identified by a hard-
coded well-known JXTAnonym service ID. The inclu-
sion of service related-data in this section is also used by
some other JXTA services, such as the PSE Member-
ship Service. The main advantage of this approach is
that it is guaranteed that the service’s Pipe Advertise-
ment is always being published while the peer is online,
thus being always available and up to date. In addi-
tion, each peer’s Peer Advertisement contains all the
information required by JXTAnonym: the local service
Pipe Advertisement and the peer’s cryptographic data.
Once a peer decides to stop participating in the
anonymous network, the service parameter entry is
removed from the Peer Advertisement, continuing its
publication as normal. Due to the JXTA’s architecture,
this new Advertisement will be propagated across the
Peer Group, replacing the old one. If a peer becomes
unreachable, its Peer Advertisement is not going to be
updated any longer, being flushed after the expiration
time is reached. Once this happens, the JXTAnonym
Pipe Advertisement will stop being available too, guar-
anteeing that at any time only active instances of the
service are published.
3.2.2 Message Setup
This step initiates the onion routing process and is per-
formed by the peer who wants to anonymously access
an end service deployed at a remote peer within the
same group.
First of all, we will describe the onion layering
procedure in JXTAnonym, since it is used at several
steps in the message setup process. The layering pro-
cedure accepts two parameters: OnionCore, which is
a JXTA Message structure which may contain any ar-
bitrary data, and PeerAdvList = Adv1, · · · , Advn, an
ordered sequence of Peer Advertisements.
For each Peer Advertisement Advi, from n . . . 1,
the following process is iteratively executed. Onioni is
considered the result of each iteration, being Onion1
the final result:
1. This iteration’s input, inputData, is chosen.
a. For the first iteration (i = n) the OnionCore
structure is considered inputData.
b. For the rest of iterations (i = n − 1, . . . , 1),
the result of previous iteration, Onioni+1 is
considered inputData.
2. The public key PKi is retrieved from Advi’s Mem-
bership Service definition entry. Under the context
of a peer group which implements the PSE Mem-
bership Service, it is guaranteed that PKi actually
exists.
3. inputData is encrypted using PKi under a
wrapped key scheme [15], generating EncInput-
Data.
4. Advi’s PID field (the peer’s unique identifier) is
retrieved.
5. A new OnionLayer structure is generated by cre-
ating a JXTA Message with the following fields:
• NextHop = PID
• OnionRoute = EncInputData
6. The OnionLayer structure becomes this iteration’s
result (Onioni).
Once the layering procedure has been established,
the message setup process description follows:
1. A peer S decides to use a service (EndService)
executing on peer D.
2. S’s corresponding client (EndClient) creates a
query message (JXTAQueryMessage), specifying
which is the destination peer (peer D), and a call-
back structure (PipeListener). Such structure is
used by JXTA applications to allow asynchronous
processing of the incoming response, so they do not
need to block until the reply is received.
3. EndClient locates the EndService’s JXTABidiP-
ipe Pipe Advertisement, from now on EndServi-
cePipe, using the Discovery Service.
4. So far, steps 1-3 describe the required steps
to access a generic JXTA service. At this
point, EndClient would open a connection us-
ing EndServiceP ipe and use it to directly send
JXTAQueryMessage. Instead, it decides to use
the anonymity service, JXTAnonymSvc.
5. If an instance of JXTAnonymSvc is being exe-
cuted at S, an anonymous client (JXTAnonymClient)
is also available. Such client is invoked, receiving
EndServiceP ipe, D’s identity, JXTAQueryMes-
sage and PipeListener as parameters. From now
on, JXTAnonymClient will manage the rest of
the message setup process. EndClient considers
message processing completed as far as it is con-
cerned.
6. A random symmetric key (FinalSymmetricKey)
is generated and used to encrypt both JXTA-
QueryMessage and EndServiceP ipe, obtaining
QueryEncryptedMessage.
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7. A new record is created in a local table Pend-
ingQueries, containing FinalSymmetricKey and
PipeListener, the former being the primary key.
8. A set of random data (RndData) is generated. The
length of this data should be between 2411 and
4614 bytes. The reasons will be explained in detail
in Section 5.
9. S generates a ResponseCore structure. This struc-
ture is a JXTA message composed of the following
name-value pairs:
• RandomData = RndData
• SymmetricKey = FinalSymmetricKey
10. At this point, a number of OnionRouter peers
must be chosen in order to create a response
path. It is considered that 3 hops is good
enough [12]. This is done by using the Dis-
covery Service to get a set of Peer Advertise-
ments RP = Adv1, Adv2, Adv3, Adv4 where is it
true that ∀Advi, (i < 4), Advi 6= AdvS&Advi 6=
AdvD and Adv4 = AdvS , and in all of them
the JXTAnonymSvc service parameter field ex-
ists (all of them deploy JXTAnonym). It is worth
remarking that, since S holds the end client wait-
ing for the response, thats the reason why it must
be the last peer in the response path.
11. Once the response path is established, an onion
structure ResponseOnion is created using the lay-
ering procedure previously described. The input
parameters are ResponseCore and RP .
12. From ResponseOnion the NextHop (Response-
FirstHop) and the OnionRoute (ResponseRoute)
fields are extracted.
13. A QueryCore structure is created. This struc-
ture is a JXTA Message composed of the following
name-value pairs:
• NextHop = ResponseF irstHop
• OnionRoute = ResponseRoute
• SymmetricKey = FinalSymmetricKey
14. Now the query path, QP must be generated. This
process is identical to step 10, but in this case,
Adv4 = AdvD instead of AdvS . Ideally, RP 6= QP .
15. Once the query path is established, an onion struc-
ture QueryOnion is created using the layering pro-
cedure previously described. The input parameters
are QueryCore and QP .
16. From QueryOnion the NextHop (QueryFirstHop)
and the OnionRoute (QueryRoute) fields are ex-
tracted.
17. An OnionMessage structure is generated. This
structure is a JXTA Message composed of the fol-
lowing name-value pairs:
• OnionRoute = QueryRoute
• EncryptedMessage =QueryEncryptedMessage
18. The Peer Advertisement of QueryF irstHop is
obtained via the DiscoveryService, and its JX-
TAnonymSvc Pipe Advertisement extracted. A
new connection to this pipe is created and Onion-
Message sent through it.
3.2.3 Message Processing
This step is performed when an anonymous mes-
sage is received at any peer that has deployed
JXTAnonymSvc. The process starts when a run-
ning instance of JXTAnonymSvc receives an in-
coming message (OnionMessage), which contains a
EncryptedMessage and OnionRoute fields. Then, the
value in the OnionRoute field is extracted and de-
crypted using the peer’s local private key, accessible
using JXTA’s PSE Membership service. At this point,
three things may happen:
1. The extracted data becomes an OnionLayer (see
Figure 2). Thus, the message must be routed to
another peer.
a. The values stored in the NextHop and
OnionRoute fields, respectively PID and
nextRoute, are extracted.
b. A new OnionMessage structure is generated,
where:
• OnionRoute = nextRoute
• EncryptedMessage =EncryptedMessage
c. Using the Discovery Service, PID’s Peer Ad-
vertisement is located. From this advertise-
ment, the JXTAnonymSvc service Pipe Ad-
vertisement is extracted.
d. A new connection to the next hop is
established using the previously recovered
Pipe Advertisement. The newly generated
OnionMessage is sent through it.
Fig. 2 Processing of OnionMessage at an Onion Peer
2. The extracted data becomes a QueryCore (see
Figure 3). Thus, the current peer is the desti-
nation, D, and holds EndService. The query
must be processed by this service. In this sce-
nario, the EncryptedMessage field holds the value
QueryEncryptedMessage.
a. The values stored in the NextHop, Onion-
Route and SymmetricKey fields, Response-
FirstHop, ResponseRoute and FinalSymmet-
ricKey respectively, are extracted.
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b. QueryEncryptedMessage is decrypted using
FinalSymmetricKey, obtaining the original
JXTAQueryMessage and EndServiceP ipe.
c. A bidirectional connection is established to
the EndService using EndServiceP ipe and
the client’s query, JXTAQueryMessage, is
sent through it. As far as the EndService is
concerned, a normal connection has been es-
tablished. It is oblivious to the anonymity
layer.
d. The process waits until a response, JXTARe-
sponseMessage, is received.
e. The response is encrypted using Final-
SymmetricKey, generating ResponseEncrypt-
edMessage.
f. A new OnionMessage structure is generated,
where:
• OnionRoute = ResponseRoute
• EncryptedMessage =ResponseEncrypted-
Message
g. OnionMessage is sent to the JXTAnonym’s
pipe of ResponseF irstHop.
Fig. 3 Processing of OnionMessage at Peer D
3. The extracted data becomes in a ResponseCore
(see Figure 4). Thus, the current peer is the source,
S. The query-response has completed its round-
trip. In this scenario, the EncryptedMessage field
holds the value ResponseEncryptedMessage.
a. The value stored in the SymmetricKey field
is extracted (FinalSymmetricKey). The
RandomData field is ignored.
b. ResponseEncryptedMessage is decrypted us-
ing FinalSymmetricKey, obtaining the orig-
inal JXTAResponseMessage.
c. The PendingQueries local table is searched
for the record which uses FinalSymmetricKey
as its primary key.
d. Using the PipeListener structure, the mes-
sage is provided to the original EndClient. As
far as the end client is concerned, JXTA has
acted just like during any standard service ac-
cess. The anonymity layer is invisible.
Fig. 4 Processing of OnionMessage at Peer S
e. The record is deleted from the Pending-
Queries table.
4. Experimental result evaluation
As a proof-of-concept, we have implemented our pro-
posal and deployed it on a private PlanetLab-based net-
work. We report the key features of our implementation
and its performance in order to assess the feasibility of
deploying anonymous messaging in a JXTA network.
The testbed deployed a JXTA peer group consist-
ing in a single node operating as a Rendezvous Peer
and 32 nodes as a Edge Peers. This is considered a
typical group [16]. This peer group was based on the
PSE Membership Service and all Edge Peers deployed
the JXTAnonym service, as well as an additional test
end service called EchoService, which was anonymized.
This service basically replies with the same content as
the query.
At this point, some tests were conducted in or-
der to test the performance of using JXTA services
with and without anonymity. The goal of these tests is
not finding a performance improvement when using JX-
TAnonym, since applying security is expected to always
result in a performance overhead. The goal is to deter-
mine if whether an onion routing approach is feasible
in a JXTA network, a peer-to-peer framework devel-
oped without considering anonymity in its design and
architecture. With feasible we refer that the produced
overhead is acceptable compared with the benefits it
provides.
Our set of tests measure the average time it takes
to consume a service, from the moment the query is
sent until the response is received, and the percentage
of lost queries during transit. This test was executed
in three different scenarios and with two different mes-
sages loads. The two different message loads consist
in sending messages at maximum speed from just one
peer or from all peers at once, evaluating the network
behavior when it is very saturated. In both tests up to
250 messages are sent.
The first scenario consists in directly consuming
the EchoService through a JXTABiDiPipe, as it is
usually done in JXTA. This measure is the expected
time during JXTA’s normal operation. The second
scenario sends the queries and the responses to the
EchoServices through three intermediates nodes, as JX-
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TAnonym would do, but without using any kind of se-
curity. This scenario is called 8 hops. Using this test,
we can discern which part of the overhead produced by
anonymity is due to multiple hops and which is pro-
duced by additional computing and transmission costs
at each onion peer. The third one evaluates the cost of
anonymizing EchoService using JXTAnonym, also us-
ing three intermediates nodes.
The average time it took to consume the EchoSer-
vice in the previously mentioned scenarios is shown in
Figure 5. It can be seen that when only one peer con-
sumes the EchoService, the performance is better in
all cases, as expected. Consuming the service directly
through a BiDiPipe took 1.6 seconds, while consuming
it after 8 hops took around 6 seconds. This is a good
result, since the difference (4.4s) is less than 6.4 sec-
onds, the better time one can expect considering using
4 extra BiDiPipes to perform 8 hops. This is because
instead of using 4 BiDiPipes, 8 simple unidirectional
pipes were used. Also, the usage of encryption and the
higher message length in JXTAnonym compared with
8 hops produces a really low overhead, just 200ms.
However, when all peers consume the EchoService
at the same time, the time required to use it increases
significantly when extra hops are performed. This is
because when the 32 nodes send messages at the same
time, each connection to the EchoService produces 8
extra messages, which is 256 extra messages for each of
the 250 messages sent. Consuming the service directly
through a BiDiPipe, 8 hops and JXTAnonym took 1.8,
12 and 16.9 seconds respectively. Although there is an
important overhead in this scenario when using extra
hops, it has to be pointed out that this is the worst case,
where each peer sends messages at maximum speed. A
real scenario will be between this and the previous sce-
nario. The difference between 8 hops and JXTAnonym
(4.9s) is produced due to the use of encryption and
higher message length in a saturated network.
Fig. 5 Average time it takes to use EchoService
Figure 6 shows the amount of lost messages in
previous scenarios. Only when BiDiPipe was used no
packet loss was produced. This is because BiDiPipes
are a higher level implementation of communication
than unidirectional pipes, and perform extra commu-
nications to set up connections. BiDiPipe was set as
no reliable but with a timeout of 1 minute. This de-
creases the lost packets but increases the communica-
tion time, as has been seen previously. When extra hops
are performed using unidirectional pipes some packets
are lost. In 8 hops scenario the percentage of lost mes-
sages ranges from 6 to 20 % while in JXTAnonym it
ranges from 10 to 21 %, depending the congestion of the
network. These results show that the increase of lost
messages in JXTAnonym compared with 8 hops is very
low. In conclusion, using unidirectional pipes produce
better exchange time but increase the lost messages.
Furthermore, modify the expiration time of Advertise-
ments can change these results. A high expiration time
(as default) increases the lost messages. In opposite,
a lower expiration time minimizes the number of lost
messages but increases the congestion of the network,
since advertisements should be updated more often.
Fig. 6 Percentage of lost petitions when using the EchoService
5. Security discussion
JXTAnonym achieves anonymity by using Onion Rout-
ing, whose security has been analyzed in deep [17]. Its
main vulnerable is due to traffic analysis attacks, such
as packet size analysis. For this reason, as mentioned
in Section 3.2.2, the ResponseCore structure contains
some random data. This is used to protect the scheme
against packet size analysis and make it difficult for an
attacker to predict, just for its size, whether a message
is the last hop, an intermediate hop, a query message
or a response message. The size of each OnionCore is
around 208 bytes whereas creating a new OnionLayer
adds 399 bytes. From this data extra hops and extra
paths are calculated, obtaining that the size of the ran-
dom data has to be between 2411 and 4614 bytes.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented JXTAnonym, an
anonymity layer that uses the onion routing approach
to allow bidirectional message exchanges when access-
ing services using the JXTA protocols. JXTAnonym
provides consumer and provider anonymity in any
JXTA service access. The anonymity service has been
implemented as a standard JXTA service, and any
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JXTA Peer which belongs to a PSE Peer Group can
use it. This restriction is necessary because a valid pair
of public-private keys are necessary for implementing
onion routing, and with this assumption is guaranteed.
Apart from the fact that JXTA currently does not
provide anonymous messaging by itself, the main con-
tributions of the chosen approach are twofold. First,
the tests performed over JXTAnonym support that
anonymity is feasible in JXTA. Although the time
used to consume a service increases when using JX-
TAnonym, this amount is not so high if we take into
consideration the amount of connections which are per-
formed and the fact that encryption is employed. Sec-
ond, JXTAnonym is completely invisible to end ser-
vices and clients in terms of processing the received
data. Their internal operation stays the same whether
anonymity is used or not.
These contributions are mainly founded in the fact
that JXTAnonym is built over simple JXTA elements,
such as Pipe Service, Discovery Service or Advertise-
ments. This allows using JXTAnonym without mod-
ifying the JXTA binary release, since no new JXTA
protocols are defined. Moreover, Peer Group members
can freely choose whether they want to belong or not
to the anonymity set within the peer group. Obviously,
the higher the number of peers who decide to use JX-
TAnonym, the higher the anonymity degree obtained.
Further research goes toward extending the
anonymity layer to the publication and retrieval of Ad-
vertisements, as well as providing anonymous multicast
communications. Finally, it is also worth studying how
to apply mechanisms that thwart global attackers.
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Abstract—Nowadays, Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) are
already a very important data source to obtain data about the
environment. Thus, they are key to the creation of Cyber-Physical
Systems (CPS). Given the popularity of P2P middlewares as a
means to efﬁciently process information and distribute services,
being able to integrate them to WSN’s is an interesting proposal.
JXTA is a widely used P2P middleware that allows peers to easily
exchange information, heavily relying on its main architectural
highlight, the capability to organize peers with common interests
into peer groups. However, right now, approaches to integrate
WSNs to a JXTA network seldom take advantage of peer groups.
For this reason, in this paper we present jxSensor, an integration
layer for sensor motes which facilitates the deployment of CPS’s
under this architecture. This integration has been done taking
into account JXTA’s idiosyncrasies and proposing novel ideas,
such as the Virtual Peer, a group of sensors that acts as a single
entity within the peer group context.
1
Keywords: peer-to-peer, WSN, JXTA, Java, sensor mote,
Cyber-Physical System.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the current networked society, Wireless Sensor Networks
(WSN’s) have become very important, since they can acquire
and send really useful and valuable information with a lesser
cost of installation and maintenance, compared with their
wired counterparts. The beneﬁts of WSN’s are not only in
economical terms but also in functional ones, allowing an
easy and fast deployment, allowing the mobility of nodes and
dynamic network topologies, which has a big impact in tem-
poral installations. WSN’s have been traditionally related to
industries such as military, oil and gas, but as their popularity
has increased, they have become ubiquitous in many other
ﬁelds and are already part of our daily life [1].
WSN’s are able to provide detailed information about the
environment, and therefore, are the key to the deployment of
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS), being their main means for
data input. However, it is convenient to have some middleware
that integrates access and conﬁguration of sensor motes,
overcoming the two common limitations in WSN’s: that a
great amount of information must be distributed and processed
by constrained resources and the fact that, even though such
1This work was partly funded by the Spanish Government through
projects TSI2007-65406-C03-03 ”E-AEGIS”, TIN2011-27076-C03-02 ”CO-
PRIVACY” and CONSOLIDER INGENIO 2010 CSD2007-0004 ”ARES”.
information can be easily gathered locally, global access is
often necessary.
Peer-to-peer (P2P) networks are an efﬁcient method to dis-
tribute information in a self organized manner. These networks
also provide incredible beneﬁts in terms of the connectivity
of its devices, such as scalability and reliability. For these
reasons, we consider that the P2P systems might be a very
good ﬁt for developing CPS’s in some environments. Many
different P2P middlewares have become quite popular, helping
the deployment of such networks, but between the most well-
known ones with a long history, JXTA can be found [2].
JXTA is a set of open protocols speciﬁcations initiated by
Sun Microsystems in 2001 that has been the system of choice
for many P2P based applications, such as clipboard and ﬁle
sharing between different computers [3] and a distributed e-
learning system [4]. These applications can take advantage of
the integration of WSN. Still under development, the latest
revision at this date, version 2.7, became available in May
2011 and incorporates several long awaited functionalities,
the most relevant improvements being in security and the
simpliﬁcation of local deployments for the testing stage.
This paper presents jxSensor, an abstraction layer that
allows JXTA peers to interact with WSN’s, facilitating the
deployment of CPS’s under this architecture. Even though
extensive work already exists on the use of JXTA as a P2P
substrate to distribute sensor information, our proposal uses
a novel approach that sets it apart from others: instead of
considering sensor motes as resources to be shared inside the
JXTA network, they are considered full ﬂedged peers. This
small twist allows the main contributions of this paper: it
takes into consideration actual two-way interaction, allowing
active conﬁguration of sensor motes, and the WSN gateways’
operation remains completely in the background. From the
other network participants’ standpoint, sensor motes appear
as a normal JXTA peer, allowing the use of some very useful
JXTA capabilities which are not considered in current propos-
als, such as group membership across multiple gateways.
Following, we introduce the structure of this paper. First of
all, Section II performs a literature review with all the relevant
work on P2P-WSN integration which relies on JXTA as the
underlying P2P middleware. The description of our proposed
architecture and its underlying modules is included in Section
2012 15th International Conference on Network-Based Information Systems
978-0-7695-4779-4/12 $26.00 © 2012 IEEE
DOI 10.1109/NBiS.2012.125
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III. Section IV speciﬁes the protocol for both the P2P and the
WSN sensor side of the integration layer. Finally, Section V
concludes this paper with a brief discussion about the paper’s
main contributions and future work.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we provide a brief literature review on
current proposals which rely on a P2P middleware to distribute
WSN data. Even though proposals using different middleware
exist [5], [6], we will only focus on those which speciﬁcally
use JXTA, so it is possible to analyze how JXTA’s particular
capabilities are integrated into each approach. A full review of
such capabilities and JXTA’s architectural design can be found
in [2].
One of the most thorough works may be found in [7].
In this paper, the authors propose a quite complex general
purpose architecture, even though VANETs are the main
scenario in mind, for sensor mote data acquisition over a JXTA
middleware overlay operating on 2.5G/3G mobile devices.
This is achieved by heavily modifying the standard JXTA
distribution, thus creating an alternate version. It must be told
that the paper gives much more emphasis to the mobile device
integration aspect of the system. Nevertheless, from the WSN
integration standpoint, the most interesting contribution is the
design of the XMLSens protocol, which allows sensor motes
to announce their characteristics to the WSN gateway using
XML structures, in a manner similar to JXTA’s lower layer
protocols.
In [8], JXTA is again the middleware of choice to distribute
sensor mote data, in this case in a healthcare services scenario.
Sensor mote data from a Body Area Network are aggregated
using a PDA, which then relies on a JXTA relay peer, acting
as a proxy, to access the P2P network. However, not much
emphasis is done on the WSN part of the system. What makes
this proposal specially relevant in the context of a literature
review is the fact that it is the only approach where JXTA peer
groups are fully considered as a natural method to segment the
P2P network, from both an efﬁciency and security standpoint.
Sharesense, a P2P environment based on JXTA for moni-
toring multiple WSN’s is presented in [9]. At its core concept,
its approach relies on integrating JXTA to jWebDust, an
external Java environment, previously proposed by the same
authors, that allows developing and managing WSN based
applications . This environment, being Java based, is easy to
integrate with the Java implementation of JXTA, and from
the system’s architecture, seems to be the one doing the
heavyweight work as far as the sensor mote’s data management
and access is concerned. Thus, the system can only integrate
sensor mote networks based on this particular environment.
Additionally, a Google Earth-based interface is included in
the demo application, allowing precise location of each sensor
mote.
Nevertheless, apart from the speciﬁcs of each proposal,
some common features are shared by all of them to some
degree. Sensor motes are always considered as resources
to be shared, and two of JXTA’s core services are mostly
used to access their data. On one hand, JXTA’s Discovery
Service is used to publish and locate available sensor motes or
WSN’s, relying on advertisements, XML metadata documents,
to describe the sensor mote’s characteristics. On that regard,
each proposal provides its own custom-made advertisement
structure. On the other hand, the WSN gateway acts as a single
peer in the P2P substrate, relying on JXTA’s Pipe Service
to receive messages from other peers. This is a sound and
straightforward way to integrate the JXTA middleware to a
set of WSN’s from a design standpoint.
However, it is important to note that, except in a single
case, current proposals completely forget, or use in a very
rudimentary way, another of JXTA’s main architectural fea-
tures, and the one which actually sets it apart from other
P2P middlewares: peer groups. We deem taking JXTA peer
groups into consideration important since they allow peers
with similar capabilities to create a context for peer operation,
segmenting the P2P network and facilitating advertisement
publication and retrieval.
III. JXSENSOR ARCHITECTURE OVERVIEW
The general structure of the jxSensor network at a logical
and physical level is shown in Figure 1. This ﬁgure serves as
an overview of how jxSensor is integrated within the context of
the JXTA and WSN layers. The whole P2P-sensor integration
layer is executed in a sensor gateway, a specialized hardware
that acts as a bridge between the local WSN environment and
external networks, such as the Internet. This aspect is imposed
by the design of the WSN’s. One example of such devices is
the alix3d3 [10]. On that regard, on one hand, at the JXTA side
of the architecture, applications which desire to obtain sensor
data, usually the core behind a CPS, are executed in peers at
the JXTA Applications layer. On the other hand, at the WSN
side, the sensor motes execute ordinary Sensor Apps, capturing
and sending data, and receiving and executing actions. These
actions include changing the conﬁguration of the application
or requesting data from a sensor. In both kind of applications,
their behavior is up to the developers, and does not have to
be speciﬁc to jxSensor.
The hardware gateway executes the main P2P-WSN in-
tegration module, WSNGateway, at the JXTA’s community
services layer. As a result, it is easily pluggable to the standard
distribution of JXTA 2.7 without the need to modify the
source code, which needs the creation of a custom made JXTA
version. Furthermore, it is not necessary to install a speciﬁc
client component in other peers before they can actually
communicate with the sensor motes. Any JXTA Application
may interact with the WSNGateway module using the standard
JXTA primitives for peer location and message exchange. This
module is composed by the following components:
Virtual Peer: Acts as a peer entity within the JXTA network
on behalf of one or a group of sensor motes, storing and
managing all the information an actual JXTA peer has (for
example, a unique JXTA ID, advertisements, etc.). A single
WSNGateway may support several Virtual Peers, and thus,
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Fig. 1. Overview of jxSensor’s modular architecture
several instances of this component may be executing con-
currently at any given time, each one representing a separate
sensor mote proxy. A set of motes may be managed using
a single Virtual Peer, which groups all of them and may be
interacted with a single entity. Thus, conﬁguration commands
are applied to all sensor motes at a time, and the answer of
a query can be resolved by any sensor mote in the group,
allowing for example to distribute the energy consumption.
GroupManager: Manages all data regarding a Virtual
Peer’s membership to a particular JXTA peer group. A Virtual
Peer may belong to several JXTA groups, and therefore may
deploy several GroupManagers.
Mote Abstraction: Processes queries received by a Virtual
Peer from the JXTA network, requesting actions on sensor
motes if necessary. If a query requests current data from a
sensor mote, it is forwarded to the sensor mote, its response
is cached to an internal storage and then sent to the requester.
In the case of a query for historical data , the data is directly
retrieved from the cache, without the need to query the actual
sensor. Access control to the WSN, when required, is also
enforced at this component.
Associator: Allows sensor motes to associate with the
gateway, requesting the creation of a Virtual Peer that proxies
them within the context of the JXTA network.
At a lower level layer, the MoteAdapter service is a
pluggable component that acts as the abstraction layer that
translates queries to the actual protocols accepted by Sensor
Apps deployed at the WSN. This is one of the most important
modules, decoupling the primitives processed at the MoteAb-
straction component and the sensor motes. The implementation
of the MoteAdapter service is speciﬁc for every WSN protocol
and application used, providing high ﬂexibility, since all the
heavy work falls on the gateway, instead of each sensor mote.
A clearer idea of each component’s functionality may be
expressed with a description of a sensor mote’s operation
under the jxSensor architecture. Whenever a sensor mote (or
a group of them) desires to be accessible from the JXTA
network, ﬁrst of all, its Sensor App must send its sensing
capabilities and the JXTA groups it wants to be member of
to the WSNGateway’s Associator component. This data is
transmitted using the WSN Transport Protocol and translated
by the MoteAdapter service, which will forward the petition
to the Associator component. As a result, a new Virtual Peer
is created, which immediately joins the speciﬁed peer groups.
A GroupManager component is deployed within the Virtual
Peer for each joined group, which will manage JXTA data
exchanges within the context of that group. The sensor mote
is then considered associated to the WSNGateway, which will
proxy all data exchanges with the JXTA network via the new
Virtual Peer.
At this point, the sensor mote is available on the JXTA
network and can be discovered and accessed using JXTA
primitives as any other peer would be. Once discovered, any
other peer can send requests for data retrieval or conﬁgura-
tion commands using JXTA’s standard messaging capabilities,
which are managed by the WSNGateway and processed by
the corresponding Virtual Peer. Whenever a request implies
communications with a physical sensor mote device, it is sent
to the mote by using the MoteAdapter service. Responses are
then sent back to the JXTA network also via the corresponding
Virtual Peer component.
Even though our proposal still follows some of the most
basic JXTA integration architectural approaches used in the
related literature, as described at the end of Section II, there
are still some important differences. In our case, sensor motes
become part of the network as peer themselves, instead of
simply resources shared by the gateway. The main beneﬁts of
this decision are twofold.
First of all, if a sensor mote is considered a resource, in
order to access its data the following steps must be followed:
437
62 Appendix C. Paper: jxSensor: a sensor network integration layer for JXTA
1) Locate the sensor mote with the chosen sensing capa-
bilities using the Discovery Service.
2) Locate the gateway, also using the Discovery Service.
3) Request the sensor mote’s data using the Pipe Service.
However, under our scenario, step 2 may be completely
omitted. Once the sensor mote of choice has been located, it
is possible to directly send a request. Obviously, the gateway
is still acting as a translator in the background, since sensor
motes, due to their underlaying protocols and limited nature,
are not actual JXTA peers. But it is not necessary to explicitly
look it up, sending additional JXTA discovery requests.
Secondly, considering sensor motes as JXTA peers allows
the full use of JXTA’s Peer Group capabilities. Every sensor
mote may become a member of any peer group, and most im-
portantly, each sensor mote’s membership is not restricted by
its geographical location, which is the case in the only existing
proposal where peer groups are even considered. Sensor motes
connected to different gateways can share the same group,
providing a larger ﬂexibility in JXTA network segmentation.
For example, seismographic sensor motes spread across dis-
parate locations may be conﬁgured into a single peer group,
so applications interested in only such data may locate them
in a much more simpler and efﬁcient manner. In addition, our
approach allows sensor motes to become members of several
groups, not just a single one.
IV. JXSENSOR PROTOCOL SPECIFICATION
This section presents the speciﬁcation of the protocols
used by jxSensor at the JXTA and WSN layers. On one
hand, the former case details how individual sensor motes
or groups of them can be located within the context of a
JXTA peer group, as well as message syntax to send and
retrieve information to/from them. On the other hand, the
latter scenario details the message exchange between the
Mote Abstraction component and the MoteAdapter service,
not sensor motes. This is because, as mentioned before, the
MoteApdapter service provides the abstraction layer which
translates queries/responses to the format used by the non-
standard Sensor Apps deployed at the WSN.
A. P2P layer protocols
jxSensor relies on three basic operations at the JXTA layer,
all executed by JXTA peers: discovering existing sensor motes
in a peer group, sending data requests to them and applying
new conﬁguration to sensor motes.
1) Sensor mote discovery: The JXTA presence mechanism
within a peer group are Peer Advertisements, metadata XML
documents which offer a basic description of a peer (JXTA ID,
name and description), the means to reach them (routing infor-
mation) and a list of service parameters, which usually include
Pipe Advertisements, the necessary information to establish
connections with each particular service being executed at that
peer. In jxSensor, a Virtual Peer’s GroupManager component
publishes Peer Advertisements on behalf of the proxied sensor
motes, thus being present within a peer group as any other
normal peer from the other member’s standpoint.
In order to ease the location of sensors with particular
capabilities, the Virtual Peer’s advertisement includes the
following extra information:
• Peer Type: Speciﬁes that this is actually a jxSensor Virtual
Peer.
• Capabilities: A list with the available characteristics of
the sensor mote.
– Location: Position of the peer
– Sensor list: The list of sensing capabilities that the
mote controls, specifying each type and kind of
operations that can be executed.
• Pipe: The Pipe Advertisement that will be used to contact
this sensor mote, thus behaving just like any other JXTA
service.
A sample Virtual Peer Advertisement is shown in Listing
1. The Virtual Peer type is included directly in the Advertise-
ment’s Desc ﬁeld, using the ”jxSensor” string. In this way, it is
easy to search all the Virtual Peers inside a JXTA network, by
looking up advertisements with this particular description. The
capabilities and pipe information are included in the service
parameter list, indexed using the Svc advertisement tag.
XML Listing 1 - Virtual Peer Advertisement
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE jxta:PA>
<jxta:PA xml:space="default" xmlns:jxta="http://jxta.org">
<PID>urn:jxta:uuid-59616...7B03</PID>
<GID>urn:jxta:uuid-425A5...5002</GID>
<Name>sensorPeer_1</Name>
<Desc>jxSensor</Desc>
<Svc>
<MCID>urn:jxta:uuid-DEADB...01105</MCID>
<Parm>
<jxta:PipeAdvertisement>
<Id>urn:jxta:uuid-425A5...4704</Id>
<Type>JxtaUnicast</Type>
<Name>JXSENSOR-PIPE:sensorPeer_1</Name>
</jxta:PipeAdvertisement>
</Parm>
<Parm>
<jxSensor:Capabilities>
<location>41.383333, 2.183333</location>
<sensor>1,1,RWX</sensor>
<sensor>2,1,RWX</sensor>
<sensor>3,2,RWX</sensor>
</jxSensor:Capabilities>
</Parm>
</Svc>
</jxta:PA>
The list of sensing capabilities a sensor mote controls is
speciﬁed with an id, a descriptor code for its type and the
permissions ﬂags for the allowed operations. The id is used to
identify a speciﬁc sensing capability in a sensor mote when
a query is executed. We deﬁne the following code types: 1-
Temperature, 2-Vibration, 3-Light, 4-Humidity, 5-Location, 6-
Battery, and 7-Other.
The available permission ﬂags are:
• R: Only historic data of this sensing capability, the one
stored in the gateway, can be read.
• W: The conﬁguration of the sensing capability can be
modiﬁed.
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• X: Data can be directly read from this sensing capability.
2) Sensor mote request data: The communication between
a JXTA Peer and a Virtual Peer is done through a JXTA pipe,
the one that can be found in the Virtual Peer Advertisement,
as has been previously detailed in sensor mote discovery
section. The Virtual Peer listens at its Pipe and receives
messages. In general, the information received from a pipe
is binary data, but in jxSensor we have decided to use JXTA
Messages in order to improve compatibility and readability.
JXTA Messages can be encoded as XML documents formed
by name-value couples, under a namespace. Additionally to the
information that can be added in a JXTA Message, it contains
extra information that is internally needed by JXTA pipes. But
for simplicity and readability, those information is not shown
in examples messages bellow.
The sensor mote request data operation consists in querying
data that has been captured from one sensing capability in a
Virtual Peer. This data can be directly read from a sensor mote
or obtained from the historical cache stored at the Virtual Peer.
In the ﬁrst case, a query JXTA Message requesting a read
current data action has to be sent to the Virtual Peer. An
example of this message is shown in Listing 2. The operation
tag speciﬁes the type of operation which in this case is X. The
id and timeout tags specify the sensor id and the maximum
time the Virtual Peer is going to wait for the answer of the
sensor mote before sending an error response. Furthermore,
the transaction id has to be added in order to match the query
with the response at a later time.
XML Listing 2 - read current data msg
<jxSensorMessageQuery>
<operation> X </operation>
<id> 3 </id>
<timeout> 5 </timeout>
<transactionId> 93872088 </transactionId>
</jxSensorMessageQuery>
In the second case, a query JXTA Message requesting a
read historic data action has to be sent to the Virtual Peer.
This message shares the same structure as the one before but
with the difference that is a different operation, R. An optional
tag time can be added specifying the time when the measure
was taken. If not speciﬁed, the most recent stored data is sent.
Two possible kind of responses can be obtained from these
queries: the requested data or an error. If the data could be
accessed, it will be received in a message which contains the
transaction id, the data from that sensor and the time when that
data was measured. If an error occurs, a different message will
be received with the transaction id, and the error. The possible
errors are operation not allowed, timeout and no data. The ﬁrst
case happens when an operation is performed and we do not
have the permissions to do so, whereas the second case when
there is no data for that period of time, and the last case, when
the response was not retrieved after the speciﬁed time.
3) Sensor mote apply conﬁguration: The third operation
consists in executing a command to change the conﬁguration
of a sensing capability from a sensor mote. In general, all
sensing capabilities allow setting how often a measure is taken
and sent to the gateway (in seconds), but other conﬁgurations
can be set if implemented in the MoteAdapter service. The
message sent is similar to the one of the request data operation
but containing how often a data will be read from the sensor
mote and sent to the WSNGateway. The answer is similar to
the one of the previous operation, but only the time when the
operation was done is returned. If an error is produced, the
same error message is received.
B. Sensor mote layer protocols
The format of messages exchanged between the sensor
motes and the gateway is deﬁned by the Sensor App running
on sensor motes, which can be different in each scenario.
The MoteAdapter service is responsible of translating the
message format to the operations deﬁned by jxSensor, which
are invoked on the MoteAbstraction component, decoupling
the messages sent over the WSN and the ones of JXTA.
This allows to use the most efﬁcient implementation for each
operation at any case. Thus, this subsection focuses in the
message exchanges between the Mote Abstraction component
and the MoteAdapter service. The operations that should be
implemented at the MoteAdapter service are:
• Associate a sensor mote to a gateway, and join to some
groups.
• Request data from a sensor mote.
• Apply conﬁguration of a sensor mote.
• Send periodic data from a sensor mote.
1) Association: The ﬁrst operation a sensor has to do to be-
long to the JXTA network is associating with a WSNGateway.
In this operation the sensor should describe itself in order to
allow the WSNGateway to spoof its identity. The information
required is its location, capabilities and available sensors, and
groups and permissions. This association can be done in two
ways: initiated by the sensor mote, or manually set at the
WSNGateway.
If the sensor mote sends an association message to the
WSNGateway, the MoteAdapter service translates it and sends
the message to the Associator component, which will perform
the operation and answer with an ACK message. An example
of an association message is shown in Listing 3. The ﬁrst line
is the id of the sensor mote. The second line is the location of
that sensor mote. The next two lines are the groups the Virtual
Peer will belong and the last three lines describe three sensing
capabilities and their permission. The ﬁrst element is the id
of the sensing capability, the second is the type of sensing
capability (see Section IV) and the rest are the permissions
for each group. For instance, the ﬁrst sensing capability is a
temperature one, allowing all the operations for the group A
but not allowing to change the conﬁguration of the sensor from
group B.
On the other hand, information can be directly set at the
WSNGateway, without the need of a message exchange. This
is achieved using a console terminal session command. This
method allows two powerful features. The ﬁrst one is that
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a live WSN could be integrated to JXTA without modifying
anything at the sensor motes. Only the gateway has to be
modiﬁed with the JXTA software and jxSensor services and
MoteAdapter service adapted for the internal WSN protocol.
Then the information of the motes can be added manually
to the WSNGateway by this association procedure, and the
WSN is directly integrated into JXTA. The second interesting
scenario is when you have a WSN network where there is
just one way communication between sensor motes to the
Gateway but not the opposite. It is possible to add sensor
motes manually, only allowing ”R” permission to its sensing
capabilities. Then, the JXTA network can take advantage of
the information of such sensor motes although there is not
really a way to directly query them.
XML Listing 3 - Association missage
5438764863;
41.383333, 2.183333;
A,urn:jxta:uuid-425A5C703CD5454F9C03938A0D65BD5002;
B,urn:jxta:uuid-425A5C703CD5454F9A49857DBF78765F002;
1,1,RWX,RX;
2,1,RWX,RX;
3,2,RWX,RX;
2) Request data and apply conﬁguration: The MoteAdapter
service, whether it is permitted based on the sensing capa-
bilities, can send two types of petitions to the sensor mote.
A query for a sensing capability, or a command to modify
the conﬁguration. The messages sent in the JXTA level have
been described in Sections IV-A2 and IV-A3. These messages
are going to be exchanged between the Mote Abstraction
component and the MoteAdapter service.
3) Send periodic information: Sensor Apps usually send
periodic messages with data captured from the mote’s ca-
pabilities. Under our architecture, this information is sent to
the Mote Abstraction component. In this way, historic data
can be queried from JXTA peers without sending additional
messages to the motes, and therefore not increasing its energy
consumption. The message format is similar as the one of
association, the ﬁrst line is the id of the sensor mote, the
second line is the time when measures were taken and the last
three lines contain the id of the sensing capability, and the
captured data.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have presented jxSensor, an abstraction
layer that allows JXTA peers to interact with WSN’s. Through
this integration, it is possible to provide a feasible solution to
some of the WSN limitations on regards to data processing
and dissemination.
Our proposal uses novel approaches that set it apart from
others. First of all, each sensor mote, or an aggregation of
them, can be treated as a single peer within the context of
a peer group, allowing JXTA peers to communicate to them
transparently. This allows sensor motes to use the versatility
offered by JXTA Peer Groups to segment the network, such
as enabling sensor motes to limit their presence to particular
groups or allow different actions depending on the groups.
Peer groups are also the main gateway to deploying security in
JXTA. Secondly, an abstraction layer is set in the gateway. This
permits to incorporate deployed sensor motes into CPS’s with-
out modifying its software. Thirdly, two-way communication
is permitted, allowing both reading data from the sensor motes
and conﬁguring them. Nevertheless, networks with one way
communication (sensor mote to gateway) are also supported,
which is very useful in smart metering scenarios. Fourth, the
concept of Virtual Peer is created. This allows a group of
sensor motes to be seen as a single peer in the JXTA network,
which allows to integrate WSN with a great quantity of sensors
without clogging up the JXTA network. Finally, historic data
is stored in the gateway in order to backup the information
sent from the sensor motes and also to reduce readings by the
sensor motes, optimizing resource utilization.
Our future work includes ﬁnishing the jxSensor imple-
mentation and testing it in a real scenario. We have sensor
motes installed in civil infrastructures, such as bridges, which
monitor the healthiness of the infrastructure. Since the network
is already deployed, our goal is to incorporate the sensor motes
to a JXTA network without modifying them. The ﬂexibility
and abstraction deﬁned in jxSensor, via the MoteAdapter
service, allows this kind of adaptation. Therefore, just the
gateway software has to be updated. Other future plans are the
study on how to improve the association procedure to allow the
usage of credentials and secure Peer Groups, the creation of an
application to monitor sensor motes information from a mobile
phone using JXME[11] and ﬁnding ways to replicate historic
data between different gateways to improve its availability.
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Abstract—Currently, IoT devices are becoming more and more
popular, being deployed in different scenarios such as monitoring
the power consumption of a house or the state of an outdoor
parking spot. These networks tend to be densely populated by a
huge amount of sensors that send really short messages. Given
these characteristics, their main problem is the great variability
and unpredictability of battery lifetime, when they cannot be
plugged to a power outlet. In this paper, we analyze the mote
behaviour on a real IoT network and use the extracted data to
propose a mechanism to distribute the power consumption more
equally between all motes, regardless the number of messages
each one sends. This new proposal decreases the numbers of
interventions required to replace batteries, minimizing costs and
increasing network lifetime.
Index Terms—IoT; WSN; address clustering; Huffman coding;
power consumption
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) is producing a profound
transformation to global industry. Hardware miniaturization,
communications standardization and analytics are allowing
connecting more and more objects. The IoT devices, the
growing analytics and big data capabilities have the potential
for enhancing industry and services operations in multiple
sectors. Undoubtedly the ubiquitous presence of IoT devices
combined with their sensing and communicating capabilities is
enabling the opportunity to lower maintenance and operational
costs in an unprecedented scale.
Operational costs are especially relevant in critical infras-
tructures, where timely information can be used to optimize
maintenance and minimize unplanned downtimes. The IoT
is in pure expansion and that means connecting more and
more objects to the Internet. However, there are still some
limitations, mainly the power consumption of the wireless
sensors, the ease of handling the communication interfaces
and the global coverage.
In the recent years, research activities addressed to increase
the lifetime of IoT devices have augmented. Optimizing the
battery life of multi-hop networks has been a hot topic and
it has usually been addressed through data aggregation by
intermediate hops [1] or by using fare routing protocols [2].
Others addressed this problem by reducing the consumption
of every mote by compressing the packets sent [3] or by using
a more efficient MAC protocol [4].
However few of the presented approaches consider the
application itself and how the monitoring service is provided.
Most monitoring applications cover large areas where different
activity zones are observed. Common energy optimization ap-
proaches use the same policies independently of the observed
level of activity in a specific area. Even though, from an
individual device standpoint, battery life may be extended
using the described approaches, some devices will still deplete
their power quicker than others.
Differences in battery usage across the same network be-
comes a big factor if we take into account that battery
replacement interventions must be scheduled. On that regard,
it must be taken into account that each intervention costs
money and time, and in some scenarios, such smart cities,
it may actually become a hassle to citizens. In a scenario with
big differences in battery usage across devices, interventions
become more complex, since only some devices have their
battery replaced and a log must be kept. And they still become
frequent, since the devices which were not replaced will
deplete their battery sooner now. Of course, it may be possible
to just replace all batteries regardless of their power level at
each intervention, but that would be wasteful, from both a cost
and environmental perspective. Therefore we consider that, in
addition from increasing battery life, it is also very important
to homogenize battery consumption across all devices, in order
to facilitate interventions and reduce maintenance costs.
Given this scenario, in the present work we present a novel
approach where we consider areas with different levels of ac-
tivity. To this end, we suggest and analyse two communication
strategies based on variable packet size mechanisms which will
help to increase the global lifetime of the network. We back
our proposal by studying the behavior of a real smart parking
deployment.
The paper is structured as follows. First of all, in section
68
Appendix D. Paper: Balancing Power Consumption in IoT Devices by Using
Variable Packet Size
II, we analyse the power consumption of a real network.
Section III evaluates the effect of variable size packets in
power consumption. An assessment of two possible solutions
based on variable packet size is detailed in section IV. Finally,
section V concludes the paper and proposes further work.
II. STUDYING POWER CONSUMPTION OF IOT NETWORKS
IoT devices are small devices with limited processor,
memory and battery. Their purpose is to capture data from
the environment, wirelessly sending messages to a central
sink, which is generally called gateway. On that regard, IoT
applications can be divided into two groups, depending on
how messages are produced: one where motes report data
periodically, at fixes intervals, and another where motes report
data asynchronously, reacting to certain triggers. House power
consumption monitoring is an example of the former, since
reports are usually generated at fixed intervals, whereas smart
parking would be an example of the latter, where motes send
messages only when the state of a parking spot changes.
In the first group, messages are sent in determined periods
of time, for instance, one report message per hour. Therefore,
the power consumption of all the motes in the network is
quite similar, since all motes will send the same amount of
messages, overall. As a result, it is easy to schedule battery
replacement interventions, since the battery level of all motes
will decrease similarly as time passes. However, in the second
group, the consumption of the motes, and therefore, battery
lifetime, depends on the number of state changes, which can
be very different between motes installed at different spots.
A scenario where the lifetime of every mote is very different
complicates the process of having all the devices up. This
process is worsened when the complexity of interventions
to replace batteries must be taken into account. Following
with the smart parking example, every time a device must
be accessed, it has to be planned in advance to warn about
the intervention on the street, which costs money and has an
impact in the citizens life. For these reasons, minimizing the
difference between IoT devices lifetime and increasing the
global network lifetime could be a very important achieve-
ment.
In order to quantify this behavior in a real scenario, we have
collected real data from an installation of 500 outdoor parking
sensor motes, for more than 4 months. The data has been
provided by [5] from one of the company deployments in a
real life scenario, used to control available parking spots on the
streets. Figure 1 shows the average number of messages motes
send per day. It can be seen how most of the sensors send
between 5 to 15 messages per day. However, some sensors
send more packets, up to 30 packets per day. This distribution
matches to a Poisson distribution with λ = 9.96 that can be
used for further simulation models.
From this data, it could be detected how, in a real scenario,
different sensors send a different number of messages, which
will result in different battery lifetimes. In order to quantify
how these different number of messages sent impact on power
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Fig. 1. Number of messages distribution per mote
consumption, a simulation was run using a power consumption
model for WSN devices [6], [7].
A. Models of Power Consumption in WSNs
The power required to operate a device (PDEV ) can be
broken down into three parts (or building blocks): energy
required for data sensing (acquisition, PACQ), for application
(data processing, PPRC), and communication (networking,
PNET ). This model is based on an atomic breakdown of each
building block, where the instantaneous power consumption
is integrated over the duration of the corresponding task,
and averaged out its characteristic temporal scale (period of
repetition). Yet, putting these systems together requires a clear
understanding of their cyclic behavior.
PDEV = PNET + PACQ + PPRC (1)
The main contribution to the acquisition block is due to
the sensor itself. Driven by the application demands, when
a new sample is required the sensor is turned on and, after
a fixed time, given by the sensor characteristics, the sample
is recorded. The charge required by the sensor in the data
acquisition stage is computed with the time the sensor must
remain active and the current consumption of the sensor in
the corresponding state, but this charge is constant for each
record. Then, the acquisition current can be easily averaged
for the sampling period TSMP and, as in most applications
the sampling process repeat cyclically, this average current in
one period represents directly the global average consumption
(Eq. 2).
I¯ACQ =
QSMP
T¯SMP
(2)
Similarly, the average current in the communications block
can be obtained by dividing the total charge required to send
a radio message by the time between consecutive events
(Eq. 3). The time between messages is fixed for periodic
reporting applications but should be properly characterized
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through averaging or other statistical methods in a general
case.
I¯NET =
QMSG
T¯MSG
(3)
Finally, the processor current load can be considered as
constant, independently of the network and sampling key
parameters. 1.
Combining the three contributions and assuming that all
components operates at the same voltage level, the total
average current can be modeled as shown in Eq. 4. It should
be noted that constants A, B and C only depend on the
particular choice of technology for the MCU, radio and sensor,
respectively.
I¯DEV = A+
B
T¯MSG
+
C
T¯SMP
(4)
B. Calculating Lifetime depending mote’s activity
The power model described in the previous subsection has
been used to identify how the different number of messages
sent by motes exactly impacts on battery lifetime. The results
can be seen in figure 2, which shows how battery level
decreases as years pass, depending on the number of messages
that a mote sends. The different ranges in this figure show
the percentage of charge of the battery in 10% increments.
Meaning that the left-most area represents that the remaining
battery percentage is between 100% and 90% and the right-
most one is the remaining battery percentage when the charge
is between 10% and 0%, a flat battery.
This figure has been calculated assuming that the sensor
mote is monitoring the environment every 4 seconds and
battery capacity is 6Ah. Additionally, the size of the messages
sent has been fixed to 8 bytes. In this figure, it can be seen
that the battery of a sensor mote really depends on the number
of messages they send. Taking the maximum and minimum
number of messages from Figure 1, it can be seen how sending
5 messages per day the battery will last 10.5 years, while if
it sends 30 it will last only 6 years. This means that after 6
years of the installation some interventions to replace batteries
have to be scheduled, and these interventions will be required
during 4.5 years, until battery of all motes are replaced.
An interesting result that can be extracted from the figure is
that lines are not straight. This is because battery consumption
is not only caused by message transmission. There are also
other components, such as the one that monitors if a parking
spot is free or occupied, that are periodic and don’t vary with
the number of messages sent.
Another interesting result that was obtained after analyzing
the data is that sensors that are physically near have similar
activity, which can be classified in geographical separated
regions. This analysis is shown in Figure 3. We considered
a classification in which High activity means more than 20
messages per day, Standard between 12 and 20, and finally
1This term should be handled with care in applications requiring high
processing and filtering on each sample
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Fig. 2. Mote’s battery duration depending the number of messages sent
Low represents less than 12 messages per day. In this figure
is seen how motes with high activity are located in the top of
the figure, while the ones with low activity are mainly located
at the borders.
Fig. 3. Heat map of messages sent
C. Every bit matters
Figure 4 shows the lifetime for the motes sending
max/mean/min messages depending the bytes sent. It clearly
shows the importance of keeping packets with a small size
in order to extend battery lifetime. Just saving a few bits can
have a big impact.
These results encourage building an ad-hoc implementation
of the messages, in order to minimize their size, instead of
following standards. This is nothing new, since, in general,
it is expected that use standards is going to add overhead.
70
Appendix D. Paper: Balancing Power Consumption in IoT Devices by Using
Variable Packet Size
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
LMSG [bytes]
Tˆ
B
a
tt
[y
ea
rs
]
 
 
NMSG = 10
NMSG = 20
NMSG = 30
Fig. 4. Mote’s battery duration depending the bytes sent
However, in cases where the lifetime is too crucial, it may be
better to optimize as much as possible the internal protocol.
Interoperability is sacrificed for a greater battery lifetime, and
thus, decreased costs.
These optimizations can be in the form of avoiding Byte-
padding small fields, like the Packet identifier field. This field,
generally used to identify the packet type, is mapped to an 8
bit field, when generally, no more than 4 or 16 different packet
types are in use. The same happens with the Sequence number
field, which is incremented in every packet sent by the sensor
in order to detect packet loss. Usually, this field is mapped to
8 bits, behaving as a 0 to 255 counter, but it is easy to see that
only 4 bits (or even less) is enough to detect whether some
packets are lost in the communication.
Additionally, most of the implementation of the IoT applica-
tions hide devices under a translation layer behind the gateway.
Therefore, using handmade optimized internal protocols seems
a good approach. Though this adds some complexity to the
gateways, these devices are powerful enough to support these
requirements.
III. EVALUATING EFFECT OF VARIABLE SIZE PACKETS IN
POWER CONSUMPTION
The results obtained in the previous section show that IoT
networks based on events can have a very unbalanced power
consumption distribution between motes. This makes it hard
to predict when motes should be replaced, and what is worst,
require many interventions in long periods of time, increasing
maintenance costs.
In order to establish a better balance in battery usage
between different motes, despite the different number of
messages sent, we propose to implement variable packet size.
Motes which are prone to send messages more frequently
will use shorter packets in such a manner that, overall, the
transmission time, and therefore battery depletion rate due to
radio use, will be similar across the network. However, before
even taking into consideration which approaches should be
studied to decrease packet length, it is important to study the
potential benefits of this strategy. To achieve this end, we will
study the overall impact a given decrease in packet length has
on the system.
Using the same model in Figure 2, but modifying the size of
the messages depending the number of messages that are sent
in a linear way, Figure 5 is generated. The size of messages
in motes more prone to transmit is decreased up to 25%,
while the size of messages for motes that send few packets
is increased up to 25%. It has to be pointed out that the total
amount of information sent over the network doesn’t change,
just the distribution between motes. In this new figure, it can
be seen how lines are more vertical, showing that the power
consumption of all motes is more similar. The black dotted line
is drawn to ease this comparative, and represents 0% of battery
on Figure 2. Additionally, the shortest lifetime of a mote in
the network is increased, meaning that the whole network will
last longer. Battery duration for the most active sensors has
increased from 6 to more than 7 years. This would help battery
replacement operations, doing this replacement once every 7
years for the whole installation, with no other interventions in
between.
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Fig. 5. Mote’s battery duration for variable N bits depending the number of
messages sent
These results show that the strategy of using variable packet
size has the potential to achieve our objective of balancing the
power consumption between motes.
IV. EVALUATING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF VARIABLE
PACKET SIZE
Once the potential benefits of a decreased packet length
approach has been assessed, now we can analyze in much more
detail which methods can be used to achieve such reduction.
On that regard, we have studied two approaches using datasets
extracted from the IoT device deployment. One one hand,
Huffman coding [8], given its popularity. On the other hand,
address clustering [9], since it has been used in other areas to
improve the efficiency of systems. But, as far as we know, it
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has not been applied before to provide variable packet size to
balance consumption of IoT devices. Thus, this analysis is of
some interest.
A. Huffman coding
Huffman coding is an entropy encoding algorithm used for
lossless data compression. It uses variable-length code table
for encoding source symbols. Huffman codes are established
by storing the symbols of the alphabet in a binary tree
according to their probability. As the tree is traversed from root
to leaf, the code grows in length. Thus, symbols which occur
frequently are stored near the root of the tree and have the
shortest codes. While less frequent used symbols have longer
codes.
Additionally to providing a variable-length codification
Huffman coding also compresses data. How much data can
be compressed is quantified by entropy, defined as a measure
of the diversity or randomness of the data as:
H ≡ −
n∑
i=1
mi
m
log
mi
m
Entropy gets a value of zero when all values in the data are
the same and a maximum value of logm when all values are
different. We normalize the entropy as H/ logm.
We calculated the entropy of all gathered packets during a
period of time from all motes, as an indicator of the redundant
information present in the transmissions. The resulting entropy,
applying the previous formula to the data-set, gives a result of
H = 5.54 bits per byte. This result can be seen as a medium-
high degree of randomness in all packets. Therefore, it could
be difficult for habitual compressing methods to achieve a
good compression rate.
We used a basic Huffman coder implementation to build a
Huffman codification for our data set in order to demonstrate
that a variable packet size is implementable easily.
Figure 6 shows the lifetime of motes depending on the
number of messages sent when using Huffman encoded mes-
sages. The dotted black line is drawn to ease a comparative
with Figure 2, and represents 0% of battery on that figure.
It is possible to see how lines are a bit more vertical, as
theoretically expected, showing that the power consumption
of all the motes has been balanced just a bit. Lines are not
as vertical as in figure 5, where variable encoding was ideal.
Additionally, it can be seen how the 0% line has moved to the
right, meaning that the power consumption of all motes has
decreased. This effect is produced because Huffman coding in
addition to do variable encoding, does compression.
From this analysis, we can see that, using Huffman coding,
the lifetime of the network could be improved. However, from
our observations, compression seems to have a bigger role in
the improvements, rather than consumption balance.
Nevertheless, this is just a first and fast approach, since the
implementation of the Huffman algorithm in a real deployment
is not trivial. The drawback of this approach is that Huffman
coding requires analyzing the data prior to the compression,
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Fig. 6. Mote’s battery duration for Huffman encoded messages depending
the number of messages sent
TABLE I
CLUSTERED ADDRESSES
Cluster motes in cluster Number of bits % occurrence
High 25 5 5.2
Std 82 7 16.9
Low 377 9 77.9
in order to build the symbol tree. This requirement would
involve a non-optimized operation of the system (with no
compression) for a certain amount of time (i.e. 3 months),
collecting all data packets produced by the whole system.
Then, it would be necessary to train the Huffman encoder with
this collected data in a laboratory and disseminate the Huffman
table to all motes in the deployment. This operation is totally
unfeasible in industrial and large deployments, where access
to all sensors can be very complicated or even impossible due
to the environment or legal circumstances.
B. Address clustering proposal
Another approach to variable packet size is address cluster-
ing. As seen at the end of Section II, sensor activity can be
grouped in different clusters. These clusters can be labeled as
“High”, “Std” and “Low” activity. In order to save length on
the packet, it is possible to perform a variable-length source
address encoding for the whole system. In this case, we can
redefine the header in order to store the cluster number (using
only 2 bits i.e. up to 4 clusters) and the header source address
field to be variable depending on the size of the cluster and
the cluster that each sensor belongs.
As can be seen in Figure 3, is easy to see that a natural clus-
tering is possible because near sensors have similar behavior.
In this work, this behavior is obtained studying the collected
data, but it would be possible to analyze streets before whole
deployment is done to know what clusters can be used.
In Table I we show the whole system clustered in 3 different
address lengths, using less address bits for High activity
sensors and more bits for the ones with Low activity.
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Figure 7 shows the lifetime of motes, depending on the
number of messages sent when using clustering addresses.
Again, the dotted black line is drawn to ease the comparative
with Figure 2, and represents the 0% of battery in that figure.
In this new figure, it is shown how there are three very
differentiated sections, which match with the three kinds of
clusters. The top group represents the cluster ”High”, the
middle represents the “Std” and the bottom the “Low”.
Additionally, the figure shows how all lines have a similar
slope to the original one, but shifted. The top cluster has been
moved to the right and the bottom cluster has been moved
to the left. This means that the power consumption of all the
motes has been balanced. Motes that send more messages have
improved their lifetime, while motes sending few messages
have worsened it. Also, it is possible to see how the lifetime
of the motes from the middle cluster does not change. This
is an expected result, since the method balances consumption
between motes, but does not improve the battery consumption
of all individual motes. In this case, the lifetime of the whole
network is not as high as it would be in the ideal case, but it is
just a bit worse. The total gain is similar to applying Huffman
coding.
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Fig. 7. Mote’s battery duration for messages encoded using address clustering
depending the number of messages sent
Figure 8 shows more graphically how the balance of the
power consumption is achieved in all the motes in the network.
After applying address clustering, motes that originally had a
lifetime between 6 to 7 years have moved the 7 to 8 year
range. And the opposite, motes that originally were expected
to last between 9 to 10 years now last between 8 to 9 years.
These results show that using cluster addressing also im-
proves the network lifetime by balancing mote’s power con-
sumption. In comparison to the Huffman coding approach,
address clustering is much more easy to implement and
provides similar benefits. Additionally, the clustering strategy
used for addressing could be used to optimize other fields
of the packet. Therefore, address clustering would be our
choice when implementing a mechanism to balance power
consumption between motes in the real world.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the global battery consumption of a real
deployment of an IoT network has been analyzed. From this
analysis, it has been found that not all motes behave in the
same way inside a network. Some motes send messages more
often than others, which results in having motes with different
power consumption and battery life. As a result, there is an un-
wanted side-effect as far as network maintenance is concerned:
it decreases the time between required interventions to replace
batteries and makes them more expensive and inconvenient,
since interventions will be required in shorter periods of time.
Additionally, we have found that motes physically near behave
in a similar way, which allows a physical classification of
motes depending on their activity.
From this initial study, we have evaluated decreased packet
size as a viable solution to differences in power consump-
tion across the network. On that regard, we assessed two
approaches: Huffman codes and address clustering. This as-
sessment shows that lifetime for the most power hungry motes
is similar in both cases. However, whereas address clustering
shows a better power balance, Huffman has better overall
improvements. This is because Huffman coding, in addition
to using variable size packets, also compresses data. However,
the implementation of Huffman coding does not seem a trivial
task in a real deployment, whereas the address clustering is
straight forward.
For these reasons, we conclude that using address cluster-
ing is the best choice to improve the periodicity of battery
replacement interventions, saving time and money.
Once the viability and benefits of using address clustering
have been evaluated, further research includes studying if it is
possible to apply this approach when encryption is used. Also,
a mechanism to send different types of packets depending the
mote’s remaining battery is going to be researched. Finally,
this approach will be implemented and tested it in a real
deployment.
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Abstract
Mobile devices have become ubiquitous, allowing the integration of new information from a large
range of devices. However, the development of new applications requires a powerful framework
which simplifies their construction. JXME is the JXTA implementation for mobile devices using
J2ME, its main value being its simplicity when creating peer-to-peer (P2P) applications on limited
devices. On that regard, an issue that is becoming very important in the recent times is being able
to provide a security baseline to such applications. This paper analyzes the current state of security
in JXME and proposes a simple security mechanism in order to protect JXME applications against a
broad range of vulnerabilities.
Keywords: peer-to-peer, security, JXME, JXTA, distributed systems, Java, J2ME
1 Introduction
Peer-to-peer (P2P) applications have become highly popular due to its great potential to scale and the
lack of a central point of failure. Slowly, they have evolved from simple file-sharing environments, such
as Gnutella [10], to more complex ones such as GIS (Geographic Information Systems) or e-learning
[33, 17]. However, currently, Internet has become witness to the transition from a desktop-centric envi-
ronment towards one based on the ubiquity of mobile devices [26]. Therefore, it was natural that the next
step in the evolution of P2P applications would be following this trend [27], since mobile environments
are based on node autonomy and decentralization, just like P2P.
There are different platforms that allow programmers to develop mobile P2P applications [15, 8],
among which JXME [29] can be found, the mobile version of the well known JXTA platform [28]. The
JXTA specification defines a set of generic protocols which allow peers to communicate and publish,
find or consume remote resources, independently of the actual transport layer and the implementation
language. Such protocols are generic enough so they are not bound to a narrow application scope, but
adaptable to a large set of application types. Nevertheless, JXTA was designed with desktop devices in
mind. Thus, JXME was developed in order to allow mobile devices to create standalone mobile JXTA
networks or to participate in a JXTA network using a mobile device.
Journal of Internet Services and Information Security (JISIS), volume: 2, number: 1/2, pp. 1-21
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The main characteristic of JXME is that it seriously takes into account the fact that a transition
from a desktop environment to a mobile one requires facing challenges such as maintaining the trade off
between scalability and efficiency, as well as the idiosyncrasies of mobile devices, such as power and
storage limitations. However, the maturity of research in the field of P2P and mobile environments has
pushed through new problems often neglected in a framework’s design: those related with security. Even
under the constraints of limited devices, a security baseline must be kept in any P2P system in order to
protect it against common network vulnerabilities.
Our purpose in this paper is twofold. First of all, we examine the current state of JXME security,
focusing in one of the two existing versions, JXME-Proxied. This study analyses basic peer operations
by taking into account the whole peer life cycle, instead of in an isolated manner. From this study, it is
possible to identify the available security mechanisms and how they operate, which may prove useful to
application developers. Once the current vulnerabilities have been identified, we propose JXME-PLAuth,
a simple protocol that bypass some of JXME’s security shortcomings while still taking into account that
it will be executed on limited devices.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2, provides a brief overview of the JXME architecture.
In Section 3, we present a security analysis of JXME from a typical peer operation cycle standpoint.
Once current security has been assessed, Section 4 describes our proposal, JXME-PLAuth. The protocol
security is evaluated in Section 5 and Section 6 presents the experimental results on regards to its per-
formance on mobile devices. Finally, Section 7 summarizes the paper’s main contributions and outlines
further work.
2 JXME overview
As the response from the JXTA developer community to accelerate development in the wireless appli-
cations over mobile devices, Sun Microsystems presented a version of JXTA for Java 2 Micro Edition
(J2ME), called JXME, providing JXTA capabilities to mobiles devices [4]. In fact, two distinct versions
were developed, in order to accommodate to a broad set of scenarios. On one hand, the JXME-Proxied
version, with very limied devices in mind, which delegates all heavyweight work to a JXTA super-peer.
On the other hand, the JXME-Proxyless version is a straightforward port of JXTA, where peers may di-
rectly interact with the JXTA network. In this paper, we will mainly focus on the Proxied version, being
the one which actually takes into account mobile device limitations on its protocols and diverging from
the basic JXTA architecture, thus needing special consideration.
JXME is clearly based on JXTA, since they share the same basic specification. A detailed explanation
of JXTA’s generic protocols and services can be found in [30, 20] and in several papers in the literature,
such as [4, 14, 24, 31]. In both JXTA and JXME, the basic organizational foundation is the Peer Group,
a set of peers with common interests which agree on common services. Peer Groups are managed by the
Membership Service, one of JXTA’s core services, which manages the group members’ identities within
the group context. Identities are assigned by successfully completing an authentication process prior to
actually joining the group. The Membership Service is defined as generic in the JXTA specification,
leaving it up to developers to implement their own version, with the security level required by their
applications.
Once a peer has joined a Peer Group, any resource may be shared with other group members by
distributing its associated Advertisement, an XML metadata document describing the resource properties
and how it may be accessed. A network resource cannot be accessed without previously recovering its as-
sociated Advertisement. Advertisements are located and distributed using the Discovery Service. Every
time an Advertisement is retrieved by a peer, it is stored in a local cache and assigned an expiration date.
On that date, the Advertisement will be automatically flushed. Once a resource has been successfully
2
Appendix E. Paper: Towards secure mobile P2P applications using JXME 77
Towards secure mobile P2P applications using JXME
Domingo-Prieto, Arnedo-Moreno,
Herrera-Joancomartı´, and Prieto-Bla´zquez
located, messaging may begin using JXTA pipes, abstract endpoints which provide an asynchronous
unidirectional communication channel.
Figure 1 shows the main components of the JXME architecture and how their devices are integrated
into a JXTA network. Devices using the Proxyless version may directly communicate with JXTA peers,
whereas those which use the Proxied version version are named Proxied Peers and, since they are as-
sumed to have very limited resources, cannot directly communicate with other peers.
Figure 1: JXME-Proxied architecture
All communications from a Proxied Peer are actually destined to a super-peer which will overcome
its limited capabilities, called Relay Peer, which implements the Relay and Proxy JXTA services. The
Relay Peer assigns JXTA PeerID to the Proxied Peer before it may interact with the JXTA network.
Furthermore, it translates or summarizes requests and responds to queries on its behalf.
The communication between the Proxied and Relay Peer is performed with a simplified protocol
based on HTTP. By default, a single Relay Peer can support up to 150 Proxied Peers. The main responsi-
bilities of the Relay Peer with regards to its Proxied Peers are to listen to and answer requests from them,
translate messages received to XML and retransmit them to the JXTA network, store messages received
from the JXTA network for Proxied Peers and summarize and translate XML messages from the JXTA
network into a simple format which Proxied Peers are able to understand.
Due to its limitations and reliance on a Relay Peer, the kind of operations that a Proxied Peer can
actually execute are limited to a very small set. First of all, Proxied Peers may join a group. Once the
peer has successfully performed this operation, it may interact with other group members by searching
or creating resources (such as Peer Groups or pipes), listening to a pipe to receive data, sending data to
a specific pipe, closing a pipe and polling the Relay Peer for messages from the JXTA network that have
the Proxied Peer as the final destination.
All message exchanges between a Proxied and Relay Peer share a special simple protocol encapsu-
lated using HTTP-POST. To reduce the number of messages sent to the Relay Peer, they are stored in a
queue at the Proxied Peer and each time a poll operation is performed, the first message in the queue is
actually sent to the Relay Peer.
In the communication between a Proxied and Relay Peer each message starts with a special header
where all namespaces are declared, and then is structured as a list of individual elements which contain
the request type and its associated parameters. Every element is formatted as simple text, in contrast
with standard JXTA, which uses XML, and always follows the same syntax. The element fields have the
following order and functionality:
• Starting, a jxel string.
• The element’s namespace identifier, chosen from the ones declared in the message header.
3
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• An optional flag specifying additional element properties, such as content encoding.
• The element type, which is composed by two sub-fields: the type string length and the type itself.
• The element content, also composed by two sub-fields: the content string length and the type itself.
A sample message, is shown in Figure 2. All elements would actually be sent in a single line, but the
header and each element have been put in different lines and the text has been formatted for the sake of
readability. In this example, for instance, in the first element (second line), the namespace with id 2 is
used, the element type is request (a string 7 characters long), and the content is search (6 characters
long). This means that a search operation is being requested to the Relay Peer. The other elements are
the parameters associated to such kind of request, and will vary depending on the request type.
Figure 2: JXME-Proxied sample message
From this overview of the JXME, focusing on the Proxied version, it is obvious that the need for
Relay Peers is the main design divergence and limitation of this approach from original JXTA. The main
consequences are twofold. First of all, if a set of Proxied Peers join the network using a single Relay
Peer, then a central point of failure is created for all of them. However, and secondly, if a single Proxied
Peer simultaneously connects via different Relay Peers in order to avoid the former pitfall, it will be
assigned a different JXTA PeerId by each Relay Peer. Thus, the Proxied Peer, by simultaneously having
different identities, will be considered as several different peers within the JXTA network.
2.1 Related research on JXME security
As it has been pointed out, security is a key feature in current P2P middlewares. Unfortunately, to our
best knowledge, not many proposals exist in the literature for JXME.
Authors in [22] present an infrastructureless network composed of limited mobile devices called
Mobile Ad hoc NETworks (MANETs). For them, JXME is a significant attempt at designing middleware
for mobile devices.
On regards to the Proxyless version, since it is is a direct, though somewhat simplified, port of JXTA,
supporting the same protocols and architecture, proposals that apply to JXTA also apply to this version,
such as [3]. Nevertheless, an extensive survey on the state of the security in JXTA can be found here [2].
As far as the Proxied version is concerned, Kawulok et al. [14] show a framework which allows
wireless and remote peers to participate in a JXTA network. Authors describe the most interesting
implementation details of the framework as well as all changes made in the JXTA core and JXME
packages. The proposed framework adds a new authentication scheme based on certificates and PKI
[12]. This authentication is provided by the Relay Peer, which uses an external Sign and LDAP Server,
breaking completely the P2P model proposed by JXTA.
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To sum up, JXME-Proxyless version maintains the same structure as JXTA and therefore can inherit
its improvements, such as new security schemes. Oppositely, JXME-Proxied version uses a simplified
protocol and cannot inherit directly security improvements from JXTA. And, to our best knowledge, there
is only one authentication proposal that tries to increase JXME-Proxied security baseline, but provides it
in a centralized manner.
3 JXME-Proxied Security analysis
A global security analysis on standard JXTA already exists in [2]. Since the Proxyless version operates
just like standard JXTA, most of its conclusions apply. However, it does not apply to the Proxied version
because of its divergence from the base JXTA model, by relying some operations on a Relay Peer. There-
fore, we will only focus on analyzing the security degree of the Proxied version. From this study, we
can identify and assess existing vulnerabilities. Nevertheless, the analysis follows the same methodology
proposed in the aforementioned study, where the typical peer life cycle is examined rather than isolated
peer actions.
In order to perform a security assessment, it is useful to identify and categorize the most common
types of attack in P2P networks. All attacks can be divided into two distinct groups, according to the
degree of involvement of the attacker [6]: passive attacks, where the attacker just monitors peer activity
and network traffic, and active attacks, where the attacker purposely interferes with data or network
activity. Each group can be further classified according to the particular action performed by the attacker.
Passive attacks which have been considered are Eavesdropping and Traffic analysis. The former
consists of searching in message exchanges for sensitive information, such as passwords, whereas the
latter analyzes traffic data looking for patterns and relevant peers.
Active attacks include Spoofing, Man-in-the-middle, Replay, Local data alteration and Software se-
curity flaws. Spoofing consists in impersonating another peer. Man-in-the-middle (MitM) intercepts the
communications between two parties transparently relaying forged messages to each one. Replay cap-
tures messages so they can be reused at a later time to simulate a real message exchange initialization.
Local data alteration modifies local data to corrupt the system behavior. Finally, Software security flaws
exploit vulnerabilities due to bugs in the source code, trying to obtain unexpected actions on the software.
This assessment will focus on the communications between the Proxied and Relay Peer, also taking
into account the way a Relay Peer stores and manages its subscribed Proxied Peers’ data. All commu-
nications between the Relay Peer and the rest of the JXTA network operate under the standard JXTA
security model, so it is out of the scope of ths paper since it has been deeply analyzed in [2].
The standard JXME peer general operation cycle can be summarized in the following stages: Plat-
form startup, Peer Group joining, Resource discovery and publication, Message exchange and Discon-
nection. The security analysis follows the actions performed by a Proxied Peer according to this lifecycle.
3.1 Platform startup
The first step during platform startup is loading the JXME libraries into the system. Unfortunately, no
security model has been considered in order to distinguish correct JXME binary releases from another
one with malicious code (Local data alteration).
Once the platform binaries have been loaded, but before a Proxied Peer may join the JXTA network, it
must associate with any available Relay Peer. During this process, according to the JXME specification,
the Relay Peer generates a new peer identifier, PeerId, and sends it back to the Proxied Peer. Such an
identifier is only used within the context of message exchanges between Proxied and Relay Peers and
5
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has no prevalence in the general JXTA network. At this point a Proxied Peer joins (next operation) to a
default Peer Group, the NetPeerGroup, obtaining a JXTA PeerId.
The PeerId generation process is very important, since the Relay Peer is only able to identify Proxied
Peers by their PeerId. However, we have found that, in the actual implementation, Proxied Peers can
freely generate their own PeerId and connect to the Relay Peer, skipping most of this process. In fact,
due to this occurrence, any peer may trivially impersonate others by self-assigning a PeerId already in
use.
The PeerId generation process is an exception to the JXME-Proxied message format described in
Section 2, since the request is sent using HTTP-GET. An example of an identifier request message is
shown in Figure 3. It can be recognized as such since the PeerId is specified as unknown-unknown in
the GET command.
Figure 3: Proxied Peer PeerId request message
Sending the PeerId requires an initial communication protocol, which makes Proxied Peers very
vulnerable at startup, since the identifier is transmitted in clear text over the network, allowing an attacker
to easily learn it (Eavesdropping). Furthermore, since no authentication exists between a Proxied and
Relay Peer, an attacker can also act as an invisible intermediate with the Relay Peer, redirecting HTTP
messages (Man-in-the-Middle). At this stage, reusing intercepted data (Replay) makes no sense, since
each peer starts the platform only once.
Even though JXME does not take into consideration a secure startup stage, an initial authentication
protocol based on PKI is described in the Trusted Group proposal [14], out of the scope of the JXME’s
specification. The mechanism provides unidirectional authentication, only the Proxied Peer authenticates
the Relay Peer, ensuring it is a legitimate one. However, this authentication is provided using a central
Sign Server and LDAP database, which partially breaks the P2P model.
3.2 Peer Group joining
A Proxied Peer may join any Peer Group through the Relay Peer. As a requisite to proceed with this
process, all group members must agree to use the same Membership Service implementation. This
is achieved by sending a message with a request element which contains the join string. Group
Membership parameters are included in the rest of the message elements.
The default Membership Service implementation in JXME-Proxied is the None Membership Service,
which is used in groups without any kind of authentication, where any peer may claim any identity. It
was designed for applications with no security requirements. As a result, all data exchanges based on
this Membership Service are completely insecure.
Since the information in transmitted messages is sent in clear text, an attacker may discover the group
any Proxied Peer is trying to join (Eavesdropping) and identify important peers by its traffic (Traffic
analysis). Also, an attacker may easily impersonate any peer by claiming the other peer’s identity within
the Peer Group (Spoofing). However, during the join operation, reusing a directly captured message
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(Replay) is pointless since a Proxied Peer can only join once to a Peer Group during a single session.
Therefore, replay attacks are not a real concern.
In order to address some of these vulnerabilities, the proposal in [14] also extends its basic principle
to provide an additional implementation of a Membership Service, external to the JXTA specification.
An authentication mechanism is provided between the Proxied Peer and the Peer Group. However, in
this case, it is based on mutual authentication (the Peer Group itself may also be authenticated). This
authentication is based on certificates from both the Proxied Peer and the Peer Group and an external
Sign and LDAP server.
3.3 Resource discovery and publication
Resource publication and discovery are also fully managed by the Relay Peer. The Proxied Peer just
sends requests, using the HTTP-POST protocol, asking for Advertisements to be created or located.
Unfortunately, as a result of sharing the same simple protocol, an attacker can easily publish false
resources (Spoofing) and modify/delete the Advertisements (Man-in-the-middle) of any other Proxied
Peer, since no authentication is enforced. Any peer may create Advertisements on any other peer’s behalf
at leisure. Furthermore, an attacker can resend captured messages performing the original operation
several times (Replay) in order to produce multiple resource discovery queries.
Finally, Advertisements are transmitted without encryption and can be easily intercepted (Eavesdrop-
ping) by an attacker, which can recognize important peers, those sharing many resources, by analyzing
its traffic (Traffic analysis).
3.4 Message exchange
In JXTA, network messages are exchanged using pipes, briefly introduced in Section 2. Unfortunately,
Proxied Peers are not able to use pipes between them and the Relay Peers. Since pipe usage is a complex
mechanism which requires a non-negligible amount of system resources, it is the Relay Peer which,
again, actually manages pipes, connecting to services in the JXTA network on behalf of the Proxied
Peer. The communication between a Proxied and Relay Peer is performed using HTTP.
Pipe management requests are also based on a generic request element type. The element content
dictates the actual operation: create, to create the pipe, listen, to receive messages, and send, to
send messages. There is no specific element type to receive pipe messages. They are automatically
transmitted from the Relay Peer each time any request is received from the Proxied Peer, along with the
request reply.
As a result, different attacks can be performed: Eavesdropping, Traffic analysis, Spoofing, Man-in-
the-middle and Replay. These attacks mainly allow an attacker to send/receive and sniff messages, as
well as impersonate any peer. Moreover, an attacker can close legitimate peer pipes at will, abruptly
ending message exchanges.
3.5 Disconnection
Before a peer may disconnect from the JXTA network, all pipes should be previously closed. However,
the main limitation at this step is that no operation currently exists in JXME-Proxied for this purpose.
It is also the Relay Peer that has to decide when to unsubscribe a peer from a Peer Group. Therefore
the victim’s PeerId may be easily spoofed, stealing his open pipes, opening new pipes, preventing pipe
disconnection, and using all the groups previously joined.
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Op./Threat Evs TAn Spf MitM Rp LDA SSF
Startup V(2) N/A V(4) V(2, 4) N/A V(1) P(OSS)
P(TGMS) P(TGMS)
Join V(2) V(3) V(4) V(2, 4) N/A N/A P(OSS)
P(TGMS) P(TGMS)
Publish/ V(2) V(3) V(4) V(2, 4) V(4) N/A P(OSS)
Discover
Messaging V(2) V(3) V(4) V(2, 4) V(4) N/A P(OSS)
Disconnect V(2) V(3) V(4) V(2, 4) N/A N/A P(OSS)
N/A: Non-applicable.
V(type): Vulnerability exists.
P(mechanism): Security mechanism used
Table 1: JXME-Proxied peer operation cycle security summary
3.6 JXME-Proxied security evaluation summary
Since JXME-Proxied is Open Source Software (OSS), supported by a community of developers, and
it is also very simple and small, it could be considered relatively safe from Software security flaws.
Furthermore, since Proxied Peers do not store data locally, they are not vulnerable at execution time to
Local data alteration.
The analysis of possible attacks and the existing security mechanisms of JXME-Proxied, classified
by peer operations, provides a vulnerability map summarized in Table 1.
The four main vulnerabilities found are:
• V(1): malicious executable code can easily be built and cannot be automatically discovered when
installed
• V(2): no encryption mechanism exists
• V(3): no data flow masquerading mechanism exists
• V(4): no actual authentication is enforced
The available security mechanisms are:
• P(OSS): Open Source Software
• P(TGMS): Trusted Group Membership Service [14]
4 A secure protocol extension for JXME-Proxied: JXME-PLAuth
The security analysis presented in Section 3 shows that the security mechanisms provided by JXME-
Proxied are still not sufficient to secure standard mobile applications. This is because the current version
is vulnerable to a wide range of attacks. However, some attacks can be prevented by simple schemes that
extend the basic protocols used in JXME-Proxied, adding only a bounded complexity. In this paper, we
present JXME-PLAuth (JXME-Proxied Light Authentication), a proposal to avoid Spoofing and Replay
attacks. This proposal does not try to solve every single vulnerability which was identified, which would
require a much broader set of security mechanisms, but provides a initial protection in the communication
by guaranteeing lightweight authentication. This is the first step in providing a secure mobile framework
for JXME.
The main vulnerabilities found in JXME-Proxied are produced by the insecure communication link
between the Proxied Peer and its associated Relay Peer. For that reason, the proposed scheme tries to
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secure the common message protocol over HTTP between the Proxied and Relay Peer. A secure exten-
sion for this communication protocol is built. Under the assumption that a Proxied Peer is a very limited
device, the proposed protocol extension is based on lightweight cryptographic operations, mainly hash
functions. This approach has been successfully used in other proposals for MANET based environments,
such as [13].
Protection against Spoofing and Replay attacks may be obtained by securely identifying the Proxied
Peer using any well known authentication scheme. Our proposal relies on a lightweight scheme, since the
constrained resources of devices where Proxied Peers are executed must be taken into account. For that
reason, the protection against Spoofing and Replay is obtained not by linking messages to a particular
peer identity but by guaranteeing that, given a set of messages, all come from the same source peer,
whichever that source might be. Thus, once an identifier is assigned, it can be guaranteed no intruder is
able to insert false messages impersonating the source peer. To achieve such goal, we propose the use of
a hash-chain [16] based scheme to create a set of linked values which will be used as local identifiers.
Therefore, we propose a security extension to the basic PeerId generation protocol at the platform
startup stage in order to counter attacks regarding authenticity at every stage in a peer’s lifecycle.
Instead of obtaining a PeerId from the Relay Peer, Proxied Peers generate themselves a sufficiently
long hash-chain (taking into account available resources) and use each intermediate value as its PeerId
in each successive message exchange with its associated Relay Peer. In this way, the PeerId attached in a
message changes for each successive message in a manner that cannot be predicted by a possible attacker.
However, the Relay Peer will be able to easily track identifier changes and recognize each message as
originating from the same source. Using a changing PeerId allows us to use exactly the same original
protocol format, without the need to add additional fields.
4.1 Protocol initialization
The proposed scheme needs an initialization process executed during the Proxied Peer’s startup step and
boot operation. In this process, the hash-chain is created, values are stored in the Proxied Peer’s internal
memory and the first PeerId is transmitted to the Relay Peer.
The detailed initialization process is next described:
(1) At the startup stage, the Proxied Peer chooses a random seed, s.
(2) The Proxied Peer generates a hash-chain hc(s) = {h0(s), · · · ,hn(s)} by iteratively applying n times
the hash function h(·) on s, so that h0(s) = s and hi(s) = h(hi−1(s)). All values in hc are stored in
the peers’ local memory. Figure 4 summarizes this process.
Figure 4: Hash-Chain creation
(3) The Proxied Peer’s initial PeerId, initId, is created from hn(s), fulfilling the JXTA peer identifier
specification. A PeerId may be created from any value in hn(s) according to the following steps
(summarized in Figure 5):
• The PeerId starts with the string uuid−.
• The 16 most significant bytes, msb16(initId), are the NetPeerGroup identifier.
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• From the 16th to the 31st byte the Peer UUID (from now on, summarized as as PUUID) is
specified. The 16 least significant bytes of the hash value, lsb16(hn(s)), are assigned.
• The 32th byte describes the ID type identifier. In this case, being a PeerId, the value 0x03 is
assigned.
Figure 5: initId generation
(4) A PeerId request message is sent to the Relay Peer using its well-known address. However, instead
containing an unknown-unknown string, as would be used in the original insecure protocol, initId
is announced.
(5) When the request is received, the Relay Peer randomly generates a new JXTA PeerId, jxtaID1, as
would be done in standard JXME. At this point, the Proxied Peer is considered associated to the
Relay Peer.
(6) The Relay Peer keeps track of the identifiers for its possible different Proxied Peers in a local
translation table Tproxied that contains two fields: lastId and globalId. The former contains
PeerId’s and the latter JXTA PeerId’s. The Relay Peer translates local PeerId’s to JXTA ones (as
explained in Section 2) when acting as some Proxied Peers behalf in the JXTA network. At this
point a new entry is added to the table, lastId = initId and globalId = jxtaID1, where initId is
considered the entry’s key.
4.2 Protocol execution
After the initialization process has been performed, secure communication between the Proxied Peer and
the Relay Peer can begin. Each message will use a new PeerId generated from the successive values ex-
tracted from the hc(s). These values are retrieved in the descending order from their generation, starting
from hn−1(s) and ending in s. That is, in the second message, the Proxied Peer will use the identifier:
newId = ”uuid− ”||NetPeerGroupUUID||lsb16(hn−1(s))||”03”
In general, the j-th message between the Proxied and the Relay Peers will contain the identifier:
newId = ”uuid− ”||NetPeerGroupUUID||lsb16(hn− j+1(s))||”03”
The identifier consumption from hc(s) and the translation between the changing PeerId and the static
JXTA PeerId is represented in Figure 6. To simplify this figure the identifier is represented as the PUUID
part of the Proxied Peer identifier, which is the only one which varies at each message exchange.
The verification process is executed at the Relay Peer, validating that all successive messages come
from the same Proxied Peer. This validation may be actually performed since, assuming that lastPUUID
is the PUUID section in the identifier from the last message sent from the Proxied Peer (stored in the
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Figure 6: Hash-Chain consumption and identifier translation
lastId field of Tproxied), then the PUUID section from the current message’s identifier, currentPUUID,
must hold true that:
h(currentPUUID) = lastPUUID
The detailed verification process for the PUUID of the j-th message follows:
(1) The Relay Peer takes the message identifier currentId.
(2) The PUUID section of the identifier, currentPUUID, is extracted from currentId.
(3) If currentPUUID matches with Tproxied’s lastId field, it means that someone is trying to perform
a spoofing or replay attack. Therefore, this petition is obviated. Otherwise, the authentication
protocol continues.
(4) The Relay Peer calculates h(currentPUUID). From this value a PeerId is generated following the
steps described in Figure 5.
(5) The result is looked up among the currently stored values in Tproxied’s lastId field.
(6) If a match exists, the message is not a result of spoofing or a replay attack, since no other peer
would be able to predict the currentPUUID (hn− j+1(s)) from lastPUUID (hn− j+2(s)) and use it as
a portion of the message identifier. Only the legitimate hash-chain generator is able to calculate it,
from its hash-chain.
(7) The Relay Peer stores currentId into Tproxied replacing the old value matched in step (5). It be-
comes the entry’s new key.
(8) If, as a result of the received request, the Relay Peer needs to send messages towards the JXTA
network on behalf of the Proxied Peer, the value stored in the globalId field is used.
4.3 Hash-chain refresh
When a hash-chain is about to reach s, a new one must be generated and its initial value refreshed at the
Relay Peer so the new hash-chain values may be used. s will be used as the PUUID part of the PeerId in
the refresh message. To allow this process, the set of operations that a Proxied Peer can perform using
HTTP-GET is extended with a renew command. This new parameter is used to announce a refresh in
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the hash-chain, containing as its associated parameter the new Id:
”uuid− ”||netPeerGroupUUID||hn(newSeed)||”03”
When the Relay Peer receives any message which contains a renew command, in step 6 of the verifi-
cation process, its content value (newId) is the one stored instead of the message’s currentId, initializing
the new set of local identifiers.
As it has been mentioned before, the proposed approach avoids Spoofing and Replay attacks. Further-
more, this proposal minimizes the modifications of the JXME protocols, since no additional request
type is defined. The renew command piggybacks inside any other naturally occurring request, such as
a listen request, just like an additional parameter, and will be processed along the original request.
Therefore, there is no need to send a single message with the sole purpose of transmitting hash-chain
data, reducing the overhead by taking advantage of existing transmissions. Furthermore, while no refresh
is needed, the secure scheme does not even impact on the HTTP-GET protocol, since the peer identifier
field is invisibly used, instead of using additional message element types.
On regards to the computational cost of this proposal, it is worth mention that the only cryptographic
operations used are hash value computations. Hash values are lightweight cryptographic operations
which can be efficiently computed even in constrained devices.
5 JXME-PLAuth security evaluation
JXME-PLAuth adds simple mechanisms to provide protection against Spoofing and Reply attacks. Other
attacks, such as Man-in-the-middle attacks, are not protected. This is because our proposal tries to be as
simple as possible. Also, these attacks are not expected in some scenarios, such as when communications
are direct.
The mechanism used to renew the hash-chain is authenticated using the same mechanism of hash-
chain identifiers, therefore it is as secure as normal authentication using hash-chains.
Some messages can be lost, this can be solved in several ways [23, 7]. An easy integration of this
mechanism in JXME-PLAuth can be done by adding a new parameter in exchanged messages containing
the position of the peer identifier in its hash-chain. Also, the Relay Peer has to store and maintain updated
this new information in its local translation table. Then, when the Relay Peer receives a message which
contains a peer identifier that does not match in the local translation table, it can perform further hashes
based on the identifier and the position in the hash-chain. If a matching is produced means that a previous
message has been lost, but by this mechanism the local table is updated and further messages of this
Proxied Peer can still be secure authenticated.
A security analysis similar as the one performed in Section 3 is conducted to our security proposal,
JXME-PLAuth. This analysis follows the same methodology as before and just the security in the com-
munications between the Proxied and the Relay Peer are analyzed.
5.1 Platform startup
In this stage the Proxied Peer becomes linked with its Relay Peer. Now it is safe of Spoofing attacks,
since no other peer can authenticate itself impersonating another peer.
If one Peer tries to do so, it is going to receive an error. This is explained in Section 4.2. Peers can
know current identifiers of other peers but cannot predict their next identifiers and therefore peers are
secure authenticated.
There are two possible scenarios potentially prone to suffer security threads:
12
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(1) Two Proxied Peers use the same identifier but in different Relay Peers.
(2) A Proxied Peer (P1) is authenticated in a Relay Peer (R1). Another Proxied Peer (P2) capture P1’s
identities and authenticate itself in R1 but always using the previous identifier of P1.
Both scenarios are extreme but possible cases. To understand how this protocol deal with these
scenarios is important to have in mind Figure 6, where is shown that there are two identifiers: One
internal identifier between the Proxied Peer and the Relay Peer, and one global identifier inside the
JXTA Peer Group. This analysis, and in general all the paper, is only focused on the first identifier, the
internal one.
In the first scenario both Proxied Peers will have the same internal identifier but in different Proxied
Peers. And these peers will probably have different JXTA identifiers, but this is responsibility of the
JXTA Membership Service, outside of the scope of this analysis. Therefore, secure authentication is
provided.
In the second scenario both Proxied Peers (P1 and P2) will be authenticated at the same Relay Peer.
At any moment, P1 will have its identity based on hi(s) while P2 in hi+1(s) (previous P1’s identifier).
Therefore, both internal identifiers are different. P2’s identifier must always come, at minimum, one step
before P1’s identifier, otherwise P2 is going to receive an error when authenticating. Also, as previous
scenario, the JXTA identifier of both peers should be different.
5.2 Peer Group joining
A Proxied Peer has to send a message to its Relay Peer in order to request to join a Peer Group. In this
case, this operation is protected against Spoofing attacks since only the Proxied Peer can know the next
identifier in the hash-chain.
5.3 Resource discovery and publication
This operation is also performed by a Proxied Peer by sending a message to its Relay Peer. In this case
the Proxied Peer is also secured from spoofing attacks since non other peer different than it can send
a message with its next identifier to its Relay Peer to find or create a resource in its behalf. Also, the
message is protected against Replay attacks since when a message is resend with the same identifier, the
Relay Peer will discard it.
5.4 Message exchange
Performing this operation produces a similar message as the previous step. In this case, Spoofing and Re-
play attacks are as well secured since no one knows Proxied Peer’s next identifier and captured packages
will be discarded by the Relay Peer if replayed.
5.5 Disconnection
In this operation, when a Proxied Peer decides to leave the network, it still does not have a specific
operation to remove completely all its information stored in its Relay Peer. But using this authentication
scheme prevents that other peers could perform Spoofing attacks, like closing its open pipes. Also,
this mechanism guarantees that when a Proxied Peer disconnects from the network no one can steal its
information contained in its Relay Peer. This is because the authentication scheme will remain working
until the Relay Peer decides to remove Proxied Peer’s data.
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Op./Threat Evs TAn Spf MitM Rp LDA SSF
Startup V(2) N/A P(JXME V(2) N/A V(1) P(OSS)
-PLAuth) P(TGMS)
P(TGMS)
Join V(2) V(3) P(JXME V(2) N/A N/A P(OSS)
-PLAuth) P(TGMS)
P(TGMS)
Publish/ V(2) V(3) P(JXME V(2) P(JXME N/A P(OSS)
Discover -PLAuth) -PLAuth)
Messaging V(2) V(3) P(JXME V(2) P(JXME N/A P(OSS)
-PLAuth) -PLAuth)
Disconnect V(2) V(3) P(JXME V(2) N/A N/A P(OSS)
-PLAuth)
N/A: Non-applicable.
V(type): Vulnerability exists.
P(mechanism): Security mechanism used
Table 2: JXME-Proxied using JXME-PLAuth extension peer operation cycle security summary
5.6 JXME-PLAuth security summary
The security analysis presented in this section verify that our security proposal JXME-PLAuth provides
an enough strong authentication mechanism that prevents Proxied Peers from Spoofing and Replay at-
tacks. From Table 1,
Table 2 has been generated in order to summarize this analysis. It shows that the vulnerability
produced by the lack of an authentication scheme (V(4)) has been patched. Therefore, those attacks that
were allowed only due to this vulnerability are avoided.
6 JXME-PLAuth experimental results
Some real experiments were done to test how the proposed security improvement to the JXME-Proxied
framework impacts its overall behavior. The actual performance of our proposal implementation has
been evaluated by assessing how the protocol extensions in this new security scheme would affect a
Proxied Peer in terms of resource utilization. A mobile device acts as a Proxied Peer and a computer acts
as a Relay Peer in these tests.
The mobile device needs network connectivity to exchange data with the Relay Peer and an open
operating system which allows the execution of J2ME applications and obtaining information about the
state of its resources, such as memory or battery usage. There are many operating systems for mobile
devices, such as iOS [1], WebOS [21], Windows Phone 7 [19] or Android OS [11], but the one that
fulfilled most our requirements was the Android OS. The main reason is the fact that this mobile operating
system is based in a modified version of the linux kernel, which allows a high degree of customization
and direct access to device resources. In addition, Android OS is becoming very popular and is being
used in a large range of devices. Finally, although it does not allow to natively run J2ME applications,
it natively supports Java. But, since native Android OS applications are being more popular than J2ME
ones, it motivates us in spending some effort in customizing JXME-Proxied to be able to execute it in
the large amount of devices that run Android OS.
The mobile phone chosen was the HTC Hero. This device was one of the most popular Android
mobile phones at the moment of selecting a device for our tests but compared with new mobile phones
its hardware is obsolete. Therefore, if JXME-PLAuth can be handled by this device, new devices will
deal with it better. The HTC Hero has a processor Qualcomm MSM7200A 528 MHz, 512 MB of ROM,
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288 MB of RAM, display of 3.2-inch TFT-LCD touch-sensitive with 320x480 HVGA resolution, Wi-Fi
IEEE 802.11 b/g and rechargeable Lithium-ion battery with 3.7 V and 1350 mAh of capacity.
On regards to the computer, it has to be powerful enough to act as a Relay Peer and addressable,
to receive communications from the Proxied Peer. Most of today’s computers meet these requirements.
The chosen computer has been a laptop computer, a MacBook Pro, which can be addressed through Wifi
or Ethernet.
The communication channel used was Wi-Fi, since it is the one shared between both devices, and a
wireless router was used in order to connect them.
The tests have to provide an idea of the overhead produced in a Proxied Peer implementing security. It
is also assumed that a minimum overhead will be produced in the Relay Peer, but since it is expected that
it has enough capabilities to deal with the extra work, these tests are not going to focus on it. The main
test consisted in assess the behavior of a real JXME-Proxied application, a chat application, comparing
a version which implements security with one which does not.
6.1 Test application
This test assessed the impact of the proposed security mechanism in a real application. The goal of this
test is to detect the general influence of using security in the JXME messaging service.
The default JXME-Proxied distribution comes with a couple of sample applications to show the
potential of this framework. One of these applications is a simple chat, which allows Proxied Peers to
exchange messages between them.
This chat was chosen as the application for this test for many reasons:
• Message exchange is a typical operation in mobile devices. Until recently, this operation has been
done using Short Message Service (SMS).
• With the extension of having access to the Internet network from mobile devices, some chat appli-
cations [32, 18] are getting really popular in this environment.
• This application is focused in communication rather than in computation, which allows an inten-
sive test of JXME.
• The core structure of a chat application is simple.
However, since this chat is written in J2ME language and the Android OS cannot run it directly, some
modifications have been performed. This is because while Android applications are written in Java, there
is no Java Virtual Machine in the platform and Java bytecode cannot be executed. Java classes get re-
compiled into a Dalvik executable and run on a Dalvik virtual machine. Dalvik is a specialized virtual
machine designed specifically for Android and optimized for battery-powered mobile devices with lim-
ited memory and CPU. The modifications done in this chat application are basically the graphical user
interface (GUI) and the J2ME framework specification used in the class responsible of the communica-
tion, the HttpMessenger Java class.
JXME-Proxied supports both CLDC and CDC J2ME frameworks specifications. The use of a differ-
ent framework specification only affects in the HttpMessenger class, which is the one responsible for the
communication. By default, JXME-Proxied uses CLDC, but Android does not support the classes used.
Fortunately, all the classes used in CDC are supported by Android. Therefore, in our chat application, we
have chosen the CDC version of the HttpMessenger class. Theoretically, all versions of this class should
have worked properly, but the tests performed showed that the CDC version was not working correctly.
However, after some small changes (always using the CLDC version as a model) the behavior of this
class was fixed.
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In this test the measured and compared resource was the battery consumption. Figure 7 shows some
snapshots of the chat application running in Android.
Figure 7: Chat Proxied GUI
6.1.1 Experimental results
This test measures the impact of JXME-PLAuth in a real application. Some considerations were taken:
• Screen light: Set to the minimum, since it is enough in most of the environments.
• Message exchange rate: A chat application is used in this test and we want to run it according to
an average usage. This data is extracted from [5], where an analysis of the typical characteristics
in instant messaging is conducted. The conclusion is that, typically, a message is sent each 10
seconds and the average size of each message is 32 chars.
• Hash function: SHA1 [9] has been used as the hash function, but any other hash function can be
used.
The main test compares the application with and without security. In both cases the time interval
between polls (operation performed by the Proxied Peer to send and receive messages to/from the Relay
Peer) has to be defined. When security is activated, the size of the hash-chain also has to be specified.
Based on the poll time used in sample applications, and the time it takes to compute hash-chains of
different sizes , the poll interval values that are considered significant are 1, 5 and 10 seconds (15 seconds
are not considered since in this application the time between sent messages sent is 10 seconds). Different
hash-chain sizes can be used for each test, but a logical restriction has been applied: The maximum
time required to compute the hash-chain must be smaller to the time between polls. Table 3 shows the
different possible combinations.
In Figure 8 the accumulated energy consumption of the chat application when using security and
different time poll intervals and hash-chain sizes is presented (just trend lines are shown for the sake of
HC size
Poll interval (s) 50 250 500
1 X × ×
5 X X ×
10 X X X
Table 3: Combination of values of time between poll intervals and size of hash-chain used for the tests
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readability). This shows that, in general, increasing poll time intervals and hash-chain sizes decreases
the consumption of the battery. Having a constant hash-chain size and increasing the poll time interval
always decrease the consumption. If the hash-chain size is 50 the percentage decrease of consumption
for 1 and 5 seconds of poll interval is 10,77%, and for 5 and 10 seconds is 55,54%. Whereas when
using a hash-chain of 250 elements the percentage decrease of consumption is 84,28% for 5 and 10
seconds. But having a constant poll time and increasing the hash-chain size not always decreases the
battery consumption. If we use a poll interval of 5 second, the percentage decrease of consumption is
1,14% for hash-chains of 50 and 250 elements (this small difference between these two scenarios causes
that in the Figure 8 both green lines are overlapped). And if 10 seconds is used, the percentage decrease
of consumption is 17,15% for hash-chains of 50 and 250 elements, and -49,81% for hash-chains of 250
and 500 elements. The increase of consumption in this last case we think that is caused because the hash-
chain is too big and does not fit into the L1 cache of the mobile phone (32 KB) and therefore more energy
and time is required to calculate and consume the hash-chain. These values indicate that increasing the
poll time intervals has higher impact in decreasing the consumption than increasing the hash-chain size.
It shows that renewing less and computing a longer hash-chain is more efficient than doing it more
frequently.
Figure 8: Accumulated consumption when running the chat application with security and different poll
intervals and hash-chain sizes
To provide some perspective on energy consumption, the device’s battery capacity is 1350mAh and
its voltage is 3.7V. Just multiplying both values (converting the hours to seconds) we get that the battery
has about 17982 Joules. When the device is functioning at maximum bright screen, the consumption is
22,5 J/min, which amounts to 6750 Joules/5hours, 13500 J/10h or 20250 J/15h. Therefore, even in the
most intensive scenario (P1s HC50), the consumption is very similar to having the device idle with the
maximum bright screen.
Figure 9 compares the accumulated battery consumption between using security or not in JXME-
Proxied when running the chat application at different poll time intervals. When security is used, the
hash-chain size which produces the better result in terms of battery usage is chosen for the different poll
time intervals. This figure shows that in general the overhead produced by utilizing security is low. This
overhead was expected because some security measures were used, but this impact also depends on the
poll time. The percentage increase of consumption when using security and 1, 5 or 10 seconds as poll
time interval is respectively 0,86, 48,77 and 2,3. And in the worst case, 5 seconds, the overhead produced
can be reduced by playing with the size of the hash-chain.
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Figure 9: Accumulated consumption when running the chat application with security (continuous line)
and without security (dashed line)
6.2 Evaluating the performance compared to HTTPS
All previous performance experiments have been done over our light authentication proposal, JXME-
PLAuth. But is also important to compare the obtained results with the overhead produced with one of
the typical authentication scheme, such is HTTPS [25]. Fist of all, It has to be pointed out that HTTPS
additionally of guaranteeing authentication also provides encryption. But a trusted entity is required to
manage certificates to guarantee this security level.
A experiment was conducted in order to compare the behavior of the system when using HTTPS in-
stead of simple HTTP in the same scenario used in Section 6.1. The results showed that while the battery
consumption of using HTTPS instead of HTTP is quite similar, the time required to perform HTTPS is
enormous. Establishing connection and sending data in HTTP in average only took 0.5 seconds, while
in HTTPS it took 26 seconds.
6.3 Tests conclusions
Previous tests analyze the impact caused by using security in mobile devices. These tests show that
in general the overhead produced by JXME-PLAuth is low and acceptable. This overhead depends
basically on the time between polls and the size of the hash-chain used. Increasing the time between
polls always reduce the overhead. However, increasing the size of the hash-chain does not always reduce
the overhead. For this reason, is important to chose a long hash-chain in order to reduce the times
the hash-chain has to be renewed, but not too long that modify memory access patterns. Using higher
authentication schemes, such as HTTPS, produces an important overhead, which justify the usage of
simpler authentication schemes.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
JXME is the JXTA simplification that allows to run P2P applications using the JXTA milddleware when
some peers are mobile devices with computational constraints. As we have analyzed in this paper, such
simplification takes an extreme effect in the JXME-Proxied version, where the mobile device constraints
imply that some of the tasks cannot be performed by the platform installed in the mobile peer and should
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be delegated to a Relay Peer with more computational resources.
From the security point of view, we have performed an analysis that shows the relevance of the link
between the Proxied Peer and its Relay Peer. Without properly securing such link, a wide range of attacks
can be performed, from passive attacks, like Eavesdropping or Traffic analysis to more active ones such
as Spoofing, Replay or Man-in-the middle.
The security analysis performed has allowed us to understand the nature of such vulnerabilities and
then we have been able to provide an effective mechanism that allows to protect the communication be-
tween the Proxied Peer and its Relay Peer from Spoofing and Replay attacks. The obtained protection
has been achieved using the concept of hash-chain in order to offer linkability between different com-
munication sessions performed between the Proxied Peer and the Relay Peer. Using the onewayness of
hash functions, linkability can be obtained at a low computational cost.
Such computational saving is translated in an affordable energy consumption, a really important
feature when dealing with mobile devices. As it has been shown in the presented experimental results,
in a standard mobile application like a messaging service running over an Android OS mobile device the
inclusion of the proposed security mechanism does not impact significantly on the energy consumption
of the device. Furthermore, the proposed solution does not imply to define new message protocols in
JXME, since it can be implemented using standard JXME messages.
As we have discussed, other attacks rather than Spoofing and Replay can be performed on a JXME-
Proxied implementation, and for that reason further research has to be performed in order to achieve the
desired protection, a difficult task since the obtained solutions must be consistent with the constrained
computational environment of a Proxied Peer device.
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